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When Ebola came to West Africa in 2014, Liberia
could not cope. The State’s already fragile public
health infrastructure was largely ineffective in responding to the illness and preventing its spread.
And, the World Health Organization’s support was
slow and stilted. By contrast, Firestone, a tire company that operates a vast rubber plantation in Liberia
and runs its own hospital for 80,000 employees, family
dependents, and persons in neighboring localities, responded to the virus much more effectively.
This Article uses Firestone’s Ebola response as an entry point to study a phenomenon too frequently overlooked. Many for-profit firms that maintain operations in failed and fragile States discharge significant
quasi-governmental functions. They provide security,
housing, food, water, transportation, infrastructure,
and healthcare. And, they undertake such tasks not
only for their employees but, sometimes, these businesses also reach beyond their own private domain to
respond to challenges impacting the local community.
Yet, legal scholarship on failed and fragile States
largely ignores the provision of public goods by these
business entities.
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This Article suggests that much work remains to be
done to grapple with the implications of the various
functions undertaken by these business entities. The
Article first details instances of corporations acting as
semi-States to add fresh nuance to the prevailing narrative concerning the role of business in failed and
fragile States. It then marshals theoretical insights
available at the intersection of corporate law and international law to suggest a more complex understanding of the behavior of profit-motivated actors in
the State’s absence.
The Article then applies this renovated model to question the appropriateness of laws that dissuade firms
from operating in failed and fragile States. It flags
and addresses reasons for caution but also considers
alternative means through which the international
community might better foster the socially beneficial
potential of for-profit firms operating in failing States.
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“[W]hen state functions collapse, citizens are often compelled to look
elsewhere to fill the sovereignty gap . . .” 1
INTRODUCTION
When the Ebola virus swept through West Africa in 2014, the
Liberian government could not cope. 2 Overwhelmed by the rapidly
spreading contagion, mounting fatalities, and widespread social panic, the country’s already-fragile public health sector neared collapse. 3
The U.N. Security Council declared the outbreak a “threat to international peace and security.” 4 Yet, the Liberian government seemed
powerless in the face of this historic pandemic, and the World Health
Organization’s slow and stilted response in deploying support has
since been the subject of widespread condemnation. 5 Ultimately,
Ebola claimed over 11,000 lives in the region, and Liberia recorded
almost 5,000 fatalities, the highest of any country affected. 6
Amidst this immense tragedy, however, there was a surprising
outlier. With the onset of Ebola, Firestone quickly sprang into action. The company, an arm of the Japanese tire giant Bridgestone,
has long run a vast rubber plantation, almost the size of Chicago, an
hour’s drive from the Liberian capital of Monrovia. 7 And, crucially,
1. Robert B. Zoellick, Fragile States: Securing Development, 50 SURVIVAL 67, 71
(2008) (writing as then-President of the World Bank).
2. See Joseph D. Forrester et al., Assessment of Ebola Virus Disease, Health Care
Infrastructure, and Preparedness—Four Counties, Southeastern Liberia, August 2014, 63
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 891, 891–93 (2014).
3. See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7260th mtg. at 2–4, U.N. Doc. S/PV/7260 (Sept. 9,
2014).
4. S.C. Res. 2176, U.N.Doc. S/RES/2176 (Sept. 15, 2014).
5. See WORLD HEALTH ORG. [“WHO”], REPORT OF THE EBOLA INTERIM ASSESSMENT
PANEL 5 (July 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/report-bypanel.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/2HML-KNST]; Suerie Moon et al., Will Ebola Change the
Game? Ten Essential Reforms Before the Next Pandemic. The Report of the HarvardLSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, 386 LANCET 2204 (2015). See
also Matiangai Sirleaf, Ebola Does Not Fall from the Sky: Global Structural Violence and
International Responsibility, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 477, 516–26 (2018).
6. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/ [https://perma.cc/7R47-6UEJ]; 2014 Ebola Outbreak in
West Africa—Case Counts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html [https://perma.
cc/FFE7-G79G].
7. T. Christian Miller & Jonathan Jones, Firestone and the Warlord, PROPUBLICA
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/firestone-and-the-warlord-intro [https://
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it operated its own hospital and health clinics within its compound. 8
These company facilities provided health coverage for Firestone’s
8,500 employees but also served a patient pool of almost 80,000 employee dependents and Liberians from neighboring areas. 9
Within ten days of its sentinel case, Firestone had established
an Ebola Treatment Unit in its compound, and the company’s health
professionals implemented screening, isolation, education, and reintegration practices that have since been widely praised. 10 As a result,
the Firestone District reported no further Ebola cases for several
months after its initial encounter. 11 And, even at the pandemic’s
height, the incidence rate of Ebola within Firestone District was less
than half that of surrounding Margibi county. 12 Moreover, almost
40% of the Ebola patients treated at Firestone’s hospital were not
even employees or their dependents but were instead persons from
neighboring locales who came seeking treatment. 13 Asked later how
Liberia’s response to the Ebola outbreak might be improved, Dr.
Brendan Flannery, head of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s medical team in the country, simply replied, “More
Firestones.” 14

perma.cc/TT3Y-9Q6Z].
8. Health Care at Firestone Liberia, FIRESTONE NAT. RUBBER CO., https://www.
firestonenaturalrubber.com/healthcare/overview/ [https://perma.cc/LCN2-XA7M].
9. Erik J. Reaves et al., Control of Ebola Virus Disease—Firestone District, Liberia,
2014, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 959, 959–60 (2014).
10. See id. at 961; M. Allison Arwady et al., Reintegration of Ebola Survivors into
Their Communities—Firestone District, Liberia, 2014, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1207, 1207–08 (2014). See also Drew Hinshaw, Liberian Rubber Farm Becomes
Sanctuary Against Ebola, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/liberianrubber-farm-becomes-sanctuary-against-ebola-1412629331 [https://perma.cc/7K6K-2QF6];
Beating Ebola: One Company’s Fight in Liberia Shows How to Do It, NBC NEWS (Oct. 22,
2014),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/beating-ebola-onecompanys-fight-liberia-shows-how-do-it-n230961 [https://perma.cc/K5YU-KQZB].
11. Reaves et al., supra note 9, at 961–62.
12. Id. at 963. See also WHO, WHO: EBOLA RESPONSE ROADMAP SITUATION REPORT
3, at 3 (Sept. 12, 2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/133073/1/roadmapsitrep3_
eng.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/P78N-BBPH] (observing that “[a]n increase in new cases
has also been reported in districts throughout the country, including Bong, Bomi, Grand
Bassa, Margibi and Nimba”); WHO, WHO: EBOLA RESPONSE ROADMAP SITUATION REPORT
3 (Oct. 1, 2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/135600/1/roadmapsitrep_
1Oct2014_eng.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/8D6N-GDTV] (noting that “[t]he counties of
Bong, Grand Bassa, Margibi and Nimba continue to report high numbers of new cases”).
13. Reaves et al., supra note 9, at 959–65.
14. Jason Beaubien, Firestone Did What Governments Have Not: Stopped Ebola in Its
Tracks, NPR (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2014/10/06/

2019]

CORPORATIONS AS SEMI-STATES

225

This Article uses Firestone’s Ebola response as a point of entry to examine an under-studied but important phenomenon. Many
for-profit firms that maintain operations in failed and fragile States
discharge significant quasi-governmental functions. 15 They provide
security, housing, food, water, transport, infrastructure, and
healthcare. And, they undertake such tasks not only for their employees but, sometimes, also reach beyond their own private domain
to respond to challenges impacting the local community.
Yet, legal scholarship on failed and fragile States often passes
over the constructive potential of these business entities. 16 Indeed,
John Ruggie, the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative
for Business and Human Rights and author of the U.N.’s Principles
on Business and Human Rights, summarized the prevailing perception of business in failing States by observing that weak, conflictaffected States “attract illicit and borderline enterprises because . . .
in practice, they essentially function as ‘law-free’ zones in which
even outright looting and pillaging are possible without fear of being
354054915/firestone-did-what-governments-have-not-stopped-ebola-in-its-tracks
perma.cc/7JQV-RJFL].

[https://

15. This Article draws on examples of companies operating in countries that the World
Bank ranks among the most fragile and difficult for doing business. These metrics are
imperfect, as others have argued. Yet, they are useful tools for focusing the current inquiry
on States with severe governance challenges. The “failed” or “fragile” States moniker is not
without controversy, but it is here used as a shorthand so as to engage the debate upon terms
deployed by global policymakers. See WORLD BANK GRP., INFORMATION NOTE: THE
WORLD BANK GROUP’S HARMONIZED LIST OF FRAGILE SITUATIONS, http://pubdocs.
worldbank.org/en/586581437416356109/FCS-List-FY16-Information-Note.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/7J5F-JJLM]; WORLD BANK GRP., HARMONIZED LIST OF FRAGILE SITUATIONS FY
18,
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/189701503418416651/FY18FCSLIST-Final-July2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLP4-B2EH]; WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS 2017 (14th
ed. 2017), http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/AnnualReports/English/DB17-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JDR2-A9UQ]. Critiquing concepts of
good governance and failed States, see, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to
International Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 3, 16 (2006); Ruth Gordon,
Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
903, 963–71 (1997).
16. See, e.g., CHIARA GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO STATE FAILURE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTIONS IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 38–39 (2010) (discussing
the constructive role of States and international organizations, but examining business for
just over a page and admitting that “[w]hile the international community stalled, Somalis’
entrepreneurship took control”); MARIO SILVA, STATE LEGITIMACY AND FAILURE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 190–93 (2014); GERARD KREIJEN, STATE FAILURE, SOVEREIGNTY AND
EFFECTIVENESS: LEGAL LESSONS FROM DECOLONIZATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 308
(2004); Gerald B. Helman & Stephen R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL’Y 3,
12–18 (1992) (advocating a system of UN conservatorship as a possible answer to address
the problem of failed States).
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sanctioned.” 17 Failed and fragile States are thus regularly described
as places of immense darkness, whose lack of a functioning government facilitates the rise of terrorist groups and criminal gangs. 18
And, it is accordingly assumed that businesses that persist in such
places are, by implication or association, opportunists that must be
doing bad things. 19
17. See JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS 29 (2013). See also John Ruggie
(Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Business and Human Rights in
Conflict-Affected Regions: Challenges and Options Towards State Responses, ¶ 5, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/32 (May 27, 2011) (observing that “[u]nsurprisingly, the most egregious
business related human rights abuses also take place in such environments [conflict
situations], where the human regime cannot be expected to function as intended.”).
18. See, e.g., Mario Silva, Somalia: State Failure, Piracy, and the Challenge to
International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 553, 554 (2010) (“In Somalia the failure of the state to
provide good governance, security, and respect for the rule of law is at the very heart of the
country’s endemic conflict. These inabilities, in turn, have fueled piracy and provided a
breeding ground for terrorist activity.”); Frédéric Gilles Sourgens, The End of Law: The
ISIL Case Study for a Comprehensive Theory of Lawlessness, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 355,
362 (2015); Brian Finucane, Fictitious States, Effective Control, and the Use of Force
Against Non-State Actors, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 35, 37–39 (2012); John Yoo, Fixing
Failed States, 99 CAL. L. REV. 95, 96 (2011) (arguing that “[f]ailed states pose one of the
deepest challenges to American national security and international peace and stability”
because “[t]hey serve as an incubator for international terrorist groups” and “[t]heir lack of
stable government authority allows them to become trans-shipment points of illicit drugs,
human trafficking, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”); Robert Gates, U.S.
Sec’y of Def., Remarks Delivered at the Nixon Center (Feb. 24, 2010), http://archive.
defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1425
[https://perma.cc/EUW9-BHX8]
(arguing that “the most likely and lethal threats . . . will likely emanate from fractured or
failing states” and labeling this “the ideological and security challenge of our time”); NAT’L
SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5N8L-C6H8]
(“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”).
19. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 48–49 (2002) (examining “the largely
uncontrolled human rights danger posed by multinationals” and asserting “the harsh reality
that corporations often profit from abusive behavior”); John Ruggie (Special Representative
of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises), Business and Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Regions:
Challenges and Options Towards State Responses, ¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/32 (May
27,
2011),
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.
17.32_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2LV-WXUS] (noting, without additional support, that
“[u]nsurprisingly, the most egregious business-related human rights abuses also take place in
such environments [conflict situations], where the human regime cannot be expected to
function as intended” and calling on other States to restrain corporate actors when the “‘host’
State may be unable to protect human rights adequately owing to a lack of effective
control”); Naomi Klein, How Power Profits from Disaster, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/06/naomi-klein-how-power-profits-from-
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It is true that firms doing business in failed and fragile States
are sometimes far from blameless. Scholars, advocates, and members of the local community have well-founded reasons to treat such
business entities with suspicion. Some business actors have historically been and continue to be involved in abusive, coercive, interventionist, and imperialist conduct in such States. 20 Moreover, Firestone
began operations in Liberia in 1926 because of an extended lease
whose terms have been widely rebuked as exploitative, and Firestone
has since been accused of a slew of human rights abuses. 21
Yet, if we only castigate such firms and presume that their
operations absent oversight by the government in whose territory
they are functioning are likely to be pernicious, we might easily overlook their ability to respond positively to governance challenges in
such areas of State fragility.
Nor, it must be said, have other actors that often receive more
positive treatment concerning their governance functions in failed
and fragile States been entirely blameless. United Nations peacekeepers introduced cholera to Haiti, causing almost 10,000 deaths,
and the U.N. subsequently refused to pay compensation, claiming organizational immunity. 22 The global charity Oxfam has also been
disaster [https://perma.cc/6FTS-VA3W].
20. See infra Section II. See also, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (listing serious crimes allegedly
committed by the Canadian oil company Talisman and observing that “[t]he Amended
Complaint properly alleges that Talisman aided and abetted or conspired with Sudan to
commit various violations of the law of nations”); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th
Cir. 2002); 4 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR. REPORT 18–58 (1998),
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%204.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W88PJJVF].
21. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (2011); Donald Earl
Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational
Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 725 n.124 (2012); Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree,
Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort
Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 476 (2011); see also Firestone and the Warlord,
Frontline, PBS (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/firestone-and-thewarlord/ [https://perma.cc/RR5H-PBR]; T. Christian Miller & Jonathan Jones, Firestone and
the Warlord, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/firestone-andthe-warlord-intro [https://perma.cc/4EJU-33SX].
22. Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights), Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/71/40823
(2016), https://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ReportGA71st.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5QQD-YC39]; U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, HAITI
CHOLERA FIGURES AS OF 27 APRIL 2018 (Apr. 27, 2018), https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha-hti-cholera-figures-20180427_en_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/
5QQD-YC39]; Jonathan M. Katz, U.N. Admits Role in Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, N.Y.
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accused of a range of violations and was recently expelled from Haiti. 23 In addition, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and international organizations like the U.N., which are tasked with assisting weak States in the performance of essential State functions, rely
on outside funding to sustain their operations at a time when certain
States are seeking to reduce their international financial commitments. 24
International policymakers therefore face a significant dilemma. The World Bank estimates that two billion people live in
States “where development outcomes are affected by fragility, conflict, and violence.” 25 However, ensuring the delivery of essential
public services by building the capacity of such weak States has
proven difficult, both in the sphere of healthcare and with regard to a
range of other functions that people might ordinarily expect the government to discharge or guarantee. 26

TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/americas/unitednations-haiti-cholera.html [https://perma.cc/ZZG2-XK8D]; Rick Gladstone, U.N. Brought
Cholera to Haiti. Now It Is Fumbling Its Effort to Atone, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/world/americas/cholera-haiti-united-nationspeacekeepers-yemen.html [https://perma.cc/D7RS-3KVG].
23. Oxfam GB Banned from Haiti After Sex Scandal, BBC NEWS (June 13, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-44474211 [https://perma.cc/CSE9-KLK8]; Haiti Shuts Down
Oxfam GB over Prostitution Scandal, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2018), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2018/jun/14/haiti-shuts-down-oxfam-gb-over-prostitution-scandal [https://perma.
cc/TF4T-T5L7].
24. Carol Morello, U.N. Budget Cuts Highlight New U.S. Approach, WASH. POST (Dec.
26,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/un-budget-cutshighlight-new-us-approach/2017/12/26/6a313f42-ea69-11e7-9f92-10a2203f6c8d_story.
html?utm_term=.1eaf9461df8d [https://perma.cc/3SWV-QBBU].
25. See Fragility, Conflict and Violence: Overview, WORLD BANK
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview
[https://perma.cc/
V247-ZHR4]. See also AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP., AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP
STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING FRAGILITY AND BUILDING RESILIENCE IN AFRICA 2014–2019,
16–17 (2015), https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/
Addressing_Fragility_and_Building_Resilience_in_Africa-_The_AfDB_Group_Strategy_
2014%E2%80%932019.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKU8-TTUK] (observing that “[r]ecent
estimates show that more than one-third of African countries, with some 250 million people,
are affected by various forms of fragility, and even more if one takes into account subnational fragility”); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1174 (2005) (arguing that “[w]eak, failing and failed states are not the
exception in many parts of the world. They are the norm, and have been since their
inception.”).
26. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [“OECD”], STATES OF FRAGILITY 2018,
at 21–68, http://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2018-9789264302075-en.htm [https://
perma.cc/YF5Z-6KYX].
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This Article explores how decisionmakers might better deploy international law to align companies’ profit-incentives with the
discharge of quasi-State functions in settings of State fragility. The
Article asserts that, when faced with second- and third-best choices,
scholars and policymakers can no longer afford to overlook the full
developmental capacity of business actors. It acknowledges and explores reasons for caution, but also suggests changes to the current
legal and policy framework that may spur positive innovation.
To reach this destination, the Article proceeds along the following path. Part I introduces readers to corporations acting as semiStates, a term used to describe business entities that not only maintain
operations in failed or fragile States but also themselves take on and
discharge important quasi-State functions. States all over the world
have privatized various functions once thought to be the province of
public governance. But, what is described here is something slightly
different. Instead, the section highlights companies that have themselves begun to discharge State-like, public functions not necessarily
because the State has nominated these companies to undertake such
tasks but because the State has effectively defaulted.
Part II offers some rationale for the absence of these actors
from previous scholarly accounts of State fragility, rooting its explanation in the historical estrangement of international law from corporations and vice versa, as scholars traditionally embraced the State as
the sole subject of the international legal system. Undoing that estrangement has occupied some scholars for the last few decades, but
the State remains at the pinnacle of the international legal hierarchy.
Indeed, even when legal scholars and policymakers confront situations of State failure, alternative forms of governance are usually neglected, and the prevailing assumption is that the State itself must be
rebuilt. 27

27. See Brooks, supra note 25, at 1184–85; U.N. SEC’Y-GEN., In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar.
21, 2005), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/wp-content/uploads/CPR%20A%2059%
202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA4W-RPZC] (“If States are fragile, the peoples of the world
will not enjoy the security, development and justice that are their right. Therefore, one of
the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all States are strong enough to
meet the many challenges they face.”). See also ZARYAB IQBAL, STATE FAILURE IN THE
MODERN WORLD 125 (2015) (observing that “instead of limiting our attention to intervention
efforts by the United Nations and regional institutions, we could turn to how private
entities—such as multinational corporations—play [or might play] a role in keeping states
from collapsing” but also admitting that “[i]n the absence of extant large-scale analyses, we
are not in a position to assert whether the involvement of/with private entities would benefit
a weak or failing state; we merely point to it as a future direction for further investigation of
the concept and phenomenon of state failure”).
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In unearthing the historical entanglement of business with the
project of international law, however, Part II also grapples with the
crucial role that for-profit firms have played in colonial and imperial
projects. This quasi-imperial function served as the original form of
companies acting as semi-States, and its legacy in the various places
discussed lingers as a fundamental reason for suspicion of business
enterprises seeming to act in place of the State. This section faces
that history head-on and acknowledges the emphasis on corporate
compliance with human rights norms that has come about as a result.
Yet, it also contends that accountability should not be the sole focus
of our analysis and that a more nuanced approach may prove fruitful.
Part III articulates the theoretical underpinnings and implications of the Article’s account. It uses the designation of certain firms
as semi-States as a conceptual tool to marshal theoretical insights
available at the intersection of corporate law and international law. It
seeks to explain and better predict when for-profit firms will voluntarily assume more significant governance tasks by conceptualizing
the reputational gain derived from the discharge of such functions as
a form of investment or insurance against market uncertainty in the
absence of traditional governance institutions.
Part IV deploys these descriptive and theoretical insights toward normative and prescriptive applications. It uses the analysis in
Parts I–III to suggest a different approach through which the international community may better foster, incentivize, and harness the socially beneficial potential of for-profit firms discharging quasigovernmental functions in settings of State failure and fragility.
The Article then concludes by proposing that when States collapse, rather than simply looking to rebuild public governance on the
same terms, the international community ought also to engage more
carefully with the possibility and potentiality of for-profit firms acting as semi-States.
I. THE BUSINESS OF STATE
When a State collapses due to war, civil strife, or cataclysmic
disaster, the inclination of many for-profit firms present there is to
leave or fold. 28 The conflagration not only increases physical danger
28. See, e.g., Lin Noueihed, Exxon to Cut Back Libya Presence As Security Crumbles,
REUTERS
(Sept.
17,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/libya-exxonmobilidUSL5N0HD1UM20130917 [https://perma.cc/9JV9-ATVD]; Vivienne Walt, Big Oil
Companies in the Cross Fire as Libyan Violence Erupts, FORTUNE (Mar. 5, 2015), http://
fortune.com/2015/03/05/libya-oil-companies-isis-fighting/ [https://perma.cc/R37L-QA7L];
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to the businesses’ employees and assets, but maintaining operations
in failed or failing States can risk reputational, financial, and legal
harm to the enterprises involved. 29 A cloud of suspicion is often
generated, and this in turn has the potential to increase the alreadysignificant costs of doing business in such States. 30 As such, this risk
of non-physical harm adds to the incentives for firms to exit at exactly the time when the country whose administration is disintegrating
would seem to need functioning organizations the most. 31

Denis Dumo, South Sudan’s Biggest Bank Shuts Branches As Hyperinflation Bites, REUTERS
(May 12, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/southsudan-banking/south-sudans-biggestbank-shuts-branches-as-hyperinflation-bites-idUSL4N1IA4H4
[https://perma.cc/CJB3YN26]; but cf. Klein, supra note 19.
29. Corporations must also navigate a complicated thicket of sanctions that may be
imposed against the collapsing State. See U.N. GLOB. COMPACT, GUIDANCE ON RESPONSIBLE
BUSINESS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS: A RESOURCE FOR COMPANIES AND
INVESTORS 13 (2010),
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Peace_and_
Business/Guidance_RB.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XVG-RPTL] (outlining these sanctions and
observing that “[c]ompanies may become implicated in abuses and allegations of complicity
in human rights abuses,” so that “[s]uch accusations may be costly both reputationally and
financially for a company and seriously affect the concerned communities”); OECD, OECD
DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM CONFLICTAFFECTED AND HIGH RISK AREAS 13, 20, 57–58, 89 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
mne/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-Minerals-Edition3.pdf [https://perma.cc/STB7-SACZ]
(urging companies to pay heed to U.N. and domestic sanctions as part of their internal due
diligence process).
30. Dianna Games, Doing Business in Post-Conflict and Fragile States: Challenges
and Risks 32 (Dev. Bank of S. Afr., Working Paper Series No. 23, 2011), http://www.
dbsa.org/EN/About-Us/Publications/Documents/DPD%20No23.%20Doing%20business%
20in%20post-conflict%20and%20fragile%20states-%20Challenges%20and%20risks.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NQD-XE5F] (observing that “[r]eputational risk is a significant potential
problem for companies in conflict and even post-conflict areas, given the shadowy forces at
large”); Easy to Lose: Reputations are Precious—and Fragile, ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2004),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2004/01/22/easy-to-lose [http://perma.cc/5UQUQK2T] (noting the general perception that “[b]usinesses are now finding that, perhaps
unfairly, they are being judged by the company they keep”).
31. Throughout the Article the terms, “business,” “company,” “corporation,” and
“enterprise” are used interchangeably and in an inexact way to encapsulate private-sector
entities driven by the pursuit of profit. The author is aware of the challenges in this respect,
but seeks to forgo precision in favor of inclusiveness, so as to capture an area of inquiry
largely neglected. The emphasis on transnational corporations is not intended to obscure the
role of the local private sector, but merely serves to highlight the problematic incentives for
business not otherwise affiliated with the fragile State to exit. On the challenges of
definition with respect to transnational business entities, see PETER T. MUCHLINSKI,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5–8 (2d ed. 2007). It may be that the use of
these terms interchangeably makes little practical difference. See Margaret M. Blair & Lyn
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249–50 (1999).
Indeed, the U.N.’s Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
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Yet, some firms decide to stay. This section examines such
business entities and frames the discussion according to the various
quasi-governmental functions that they have been found to discharge.
A. Infrastructure and Logistics
In Haiti, the Bermuda-based cell phone company Digicel
erects street signs on unmarked byways in its trademark bright red
and white. 32 After the 2010 earthquake wrought horrific devastation
and severely limited government capacity in Haiti, Digicel undertook
a range of community projects, rebuilding the iconic Marché de Fer
(Iron Market) and constructing over 170 schools. 33 Indeed, for sev-

Corporations and Other Business Enterprises uses “corporations” and “business”
interchangeably. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises),
Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
32. For an example of one of Digicel’s street signs, see Haiti Project: Update 2,
CARTOON MOVEMENT (July 13, 2011, 9:08 PM), https://blog.cartoonmovement.
com/2011/07/haiti-project-update-2.html [https://perma.cc/ZM3K-VKGV]. See also Garry
Pierre-Pierre, The Republic of Digicel, HAITIAN TIMES (July 12, 2014), http://haitiantimes.
com/the-republic-of-digicel/ [https://perma.cc/RWS3-8PXS] (noting that “[s]treet signs in
Petion Ville feature the Digicel blood red color”); Stephanie Strom, A Billionaire Lends
Haiti a Hand, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/
business/digicels-denis-obrien-helps-rebuild-haiti.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/T6ETK73D] (reporting that “Digicel, for instance, has put up street signs in parts of Port-auPrince, serving as reminders of the company’s role in public life as much as guides for
navigating the city”).
33. U.N. Sec. Council, Rep. of the Sec’y-Gen. on the U.N. Stabilization Mission in
Haiti, ¶¶ 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/2010/200 (2010) (stating that, due to the 2010 earthquake,
“222,570 people were killed, many thousands were injured or permanently disabled and 1.5
million were left homeless”; and “[t]he capacity of the Haitian State was seriously affected,”
such that “up to one third of the country’s 60,000 civil servants perished” and “[m]any
government buildings were destroyed or badly damaged”); David Adams, Irish Cellphone
Entrepreneur Banks on a Smarter Haiti, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-haiti-digicel-obrien/irish-cellphone-entrepreneur-banks-on-a-smarter-haitiidUSBRE90F0AQ20130116 [https://perma.cc/J5QN-7ENP]; Réalisations à date, DIGICEL
FOUND. HAITI, http://www.digicelfoundation.org/haiti/fr/accueil/a-propos-de-nous/messagedu-fondateur/enonce-de-notre-mission.html [https://perma.cc/CBY5-KES5] (“173 écoles ont
été construites à travers le pays desservent plus de 60,000 étudiants.”); 170 écoles
construites par la Fondation Digicel à cette date, LE NOUVELLISTE (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://www.lenouvelliste.com/article/167786/170-ecoles-construites-par-la-fondationdigicel-a-cette-date [https://perma.cc/YZM7-JHMJ]; La Fondation Digicel va inaugurer sa
171e école, LE NOUVELLISTE (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.lenouvelliste.com/
article/167862/la-fondation-digicel-va-inaugurer-sa-171e-ecole
[https://perma.cc/2Z4U2GAG]; Digicel Grp. Ltd., Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement (Form F-1) at 11
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eral years after the earthquake, the company hosted the offices of the
mayor of Port-au-Prince, with citizens seeking State action from the
mayor lined up in front of Digicel’s office block. 34 In addition to
their social impact, these initiatives raised Digicel’s brand profile,
helping it to achieve a 70% market share by 2015. 35 Yet, these projects would seem, at least at first blush, to extend well beyond
Digicel’s primary business.
Digicel is not alone. Mobile phone companies often initiate
and supervise extensive infrastructure upgrades in the States in which
they operate. 36 These challenges are particularly significant in places
impacted by weak State governance or conflict and require a significant degree of engagement with the local community.
In Afghanistan, for example, the mobile phone company
Roshan sought to procure local buy-in for protecting company assets
by paying tribes a bonus if the company’s booster stations remained
functional for a year. 37 The company has also long run a low-cost
health clinic, dug wells that have provided water for over 100,000
people, and distributed 40,000 meals a month for internally displaced
people, especially children. 38 Despite these significant outlays, in its
(Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1645826/000119312515324843/
d946689df1a.htm [https://perma.cc/D983-6WHC] (“The Digicel Foundations focus
particularly on youth-oriented programs and projects that encourage self-sufficiency in the
local community. To this end the Digicel Foundation in Haiti has built 150 schools across
the country.”).
34. See Strom, supra note 32 (noting that “[m]ost mornings, people crowd around the
reception desk of Digicel’s office building, not to complain about the firm’s services but to
see the mayor and other city officials whose offices are on the sixth floor since the
earthquake”).
35. Digicel Grp. Ltd., supra note 33, at 6 (noting Digicel’s favorable market share in
Haiti and observing that in Haiti “Digicel is one of the most recognized consumer brands,
with a top of mind rating of over 80% compared to 15% for its main competitor”).
36. John Bray, International Companies and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: CrossSectoral Comparisons 12–22 (World Bank Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Paper No.
22, 2005), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/994031468752728929/pdf/31819.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4YYR-HZEE].
37. See Mary Porter Peschka, The Role of the Private Sector in Fragile and ConflictAffected States, WORLD BANK DEV. REP. 2011 (Apr. 2011), at 55–57,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/887641468163482532/pdf/620590WP0The0R0
BOX0361475B00PUBLIC0.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4JP-NVQ3].
38. See Our Projects: Health and Nutrition, ROSHAN, https://www.roshan.af/en/
personal/community/our-projects/ [https://perma.cc/HG5Q-WXMQ]. See also Sameer A.
Azizi, Strategic CSR in Afghanistan: The Case of Roshan, An Afghan Telecommunication
Company 18–31 (Copenhagen Bus. Sch. Ctr. for Bus. & Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 1,
2012),
http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/8444/Azizi_CBDS_nr%20_1_
2012.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/3ZCR-QZTU].
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first four years in operation the company grew the number of phone
connections in the country from 20,000 land lines to a mobile subscriber base of over 3.5 million customers. 39 In addition, Roshan
partnered with Vodafone to create M-PAISA, a mobile banking service that enabled its customers to freely transfer money, and has allowed 1.6 million customers thus far to access financial institutions
without the need for a physical bank. 40 Thus, although Roshan invested in some initially unprofitable and high-risk areas of the country, it did so with the understanding that “providing telecommunications has been a catalyst in building civil society.” 41
Similarly, the relatively well-functioning nature of the telecommunications sector in Somalia has been a persistent paradox for
commentators and development analysts. 42 Somalia has long been
considered the world’s prototypical failed State, and yet various mobile phone companies have thrived, developing cell tower infrastructure that promotes connectivity and financial transactions through
mobile banking. Indeed, 35% of adults in Somalia utilize mobile
banking services, a percentage that ties much better functioning
States in the region, like Tanzania and Uganda. 43 And, it has been
suggested that the functionality of commercial operations relative to
the State may provide the kernel for a model of State-building in the
country more broadly. 44 Mo Ibrahim, founder of the trans-African

39. See Peschka, supra note 37, at 55.
40. See id. at 56; INT’L FIN. CORP., INCLUSIVE BUSINESS CASE STUDY: ROSHAN (2014),
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/2e30f3004439990d969ed62a3fbe5e0b/Roshan.pdf?M
OD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/6YUM-KQQL].
41. Karim Khoja, Connecting a Nation: Roshan Brings Communications Services to
Afghanistan, 4 INNOVATIONS 33, 38 (2009), https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/
10.1162/itgg.2009.4.1.33 [https://perma.cc/93V9-YTX7].
See also Shining a Light,
ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/8810997 [https://perma.cc/
M2PN-N388]; WORLD ECON. FORUM, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN FRAGILE CONTEXTS 11
(2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC16_Responsible_Investment_Fragile_Context.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2FLB-HS9K].
42. Agnieszka Konkel & Richard Heeks, Challenging Conventional Views on MobileTelecommunications Investment: Evidence from Conflict Zones, 19 DEV. PRAC. 414, 417
(2009); Joseph Winter, Telecoms Thriving in Lawless Somalia, BBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4020259.stm [https://perma.cc/9EK8-T66K]; Abdi Sheikh
& Ibrahim Mohamed, Somali Mobile Phone Firms Thrive Despite Chaos, REUTERS (Nov. 3,
2009), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-somalia-telecoms/somali-mobile-phone-firms-thrivedespite-chaos-idUKTRE5A21OY20091103 [https://perma.cc/ZP8A-X9TS].
43. U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
EVERYONE
107
(2016),
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_
development_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW3S-FR6L].
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44. See Bray, supra note 36, at 19–20.
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mobile phone company Celtel has explained his company’s commitment to doing business in various troubled settings by arguing that
“[w]here you have good telecommunications you usually have democracy.” 45
Infrastructure and logistics concerns are also pressing for
companies in the agricultural and extractive sphere. Such businesses
possess some commodity that they need to transport away from their
production site, but transportation gaps and security issues pose significant problems. 46 These companies may not be oriented implicitly
to the conscientious extension of the capacity of the State, but their
business activities may align with such an objective.
Indeed, some companies specialize in overcoming the logistical challenges of working in fragile States and, in so doing, facilitate
not only commerce but also the continued functionality of the State
itself. Thus, for example, Bolloré Africa Logistics, a division of a
large French logistics firm, invested substantially in the port infrastructure of Abidjan despite an ongoing civil war in Côte d’Ivoire.
The company was thereby able to reduce the processing time for containers on the docks dramatically, and the African Development Bank
(“AfDB”) later argued that, by ensuring that cocoa exports continued
to be shipped out, Bolloré had “helped keep the country from collapsing.” 47 Indeed, the AfDB’s High Level Panel on Fragile States subsequently praised Bolloré’s efforts as illustrative of the company’s
“‘Afro-optimism’ and its policy of never withdrawing from countries
in crisis.” 48 Yet, despite the conflict, the company became “[t]he
largest transporter and freight agent of Ivorian cocoa, transporting
nearly 55% of the market . . .” 49

45. Peschka, supra note 37, at 54. See also Mo Ibrahim, Celtel’s Founder on Building
a Business on the World’s Poorest Continent, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2012), https://hbr.org/
2012/10/celtels-founder-on-building-a-business-on-the-worlds-poorest-continent
[https://
perma.cc/XD63-LNMV].
46. AFRICAN UNION, AFRICAN MINING VISION: FEBRUARY 2009, at 23 (2009), http://
www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/Africa_Mining_Vision_English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FWF4-NTT8] (observing significant infrastructure challenges in many
States seeking to benefit from extractive industries activities).
47. AFRICAN DEV. BANK GRP., ENDING CONFLICT & BUILDING PEACE IN AFRICA: A
CALL TO ACTION 19 (2014), https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/
Project-and-Operations/Ending_Conflict_and_Building_Peace_in_Africa-_A_Call_to_
Action.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP38-CZFE].
48. Id.
49. GLOBAL WITNESS, HOT CHOCOLATE: HOW COCOA FUELED THE CONFLICT IN CÔTE
18 (2007), https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/cotedivoire.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SZ86-MNTM].
D’IVOIRE
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However, other businesses prefer to address their own logistical concerns, building roads and airstrips to facilitate transport of
both commodities and workers. For example, the Chinese National
Petroleum Company has invested heavily in improving infrastructure
in South Sudan. 50 A series of studies demonstrates that improved
roads tend to lead to better development outcomes, particularly in
terms of increasing access to healthcare and education. 51 Yet, the
benefit of improved transportation can also accrue in favor of nefarious actors. Indeed, it has been alleged that these improved transport
networks in Sudan allowed government troops to range more freely
in the campaign to perpetrate abuses against civilians during the
country’s civil war. 52
The relationship between business and the State in contexts of
upheaval is certainly complex, but the preceding examples should
begin to complicate the reflexive assumption that the performance of
quasi-governmental functions by business actors will always accrue
to the detriment of the State and its populace.
The next subsection points toward the illusory nature of the
failed States’ claim to a monopoly over the use of force. Rather than
relying on the State, business actors in failed and fragile States often
act instead to guarantee their own security. But, unlike the State,
such companies ensure their own safety both through overt force and
by negotiating arrangements with other rival groups present in the
territory.

50. Wojtek Mackiewicz Wolfe & Annette S. Leung Evans, China’s Energy Investment
and the Corporate Social Responsibility Imperative, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 83, 86
(2011); GEORGE G. EBERLING, CHINA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ITS PRINCIPAL OIL
SUPPLIERS 211 (2017).
51. Claudia N. Berg et al., Transport Policies and Development 18 (World Bank Grp.,
Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 7366, 2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
893851468188672137/pdf/WPS7366.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GK8-JS5M]; Atushi Iimi et al.,
Evaluating the Social and Economic Impacts of Rural Road Improvements in the State of
Tocantins, Brazil 7 (World Bank Grp., Working Paper No. 95574, 2015), http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/109021467992478157/pdf/95574-WP-P121495-Box391433BPUBLIC-Evaluating-the-Social-and-Economic-Impacts-of-Rural-Road-Improvements-inthe-State-of-Tocantins-Brazil.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA9L-NKFV]; Shahidur Khandker et
al., The Poverty Impact of Rural Roads: Evidence from Bangladesh, 57 ECON. DEV. &
CULTURAL CHANGE 685, 696 (2009).
52. See Alexander Dziadosz, Special Report: South Sudan’s Chinese Oil Puzzle,
REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-chinese-oil/
special-report-south-sudans-chinese-oil-puzzle-idUSBRE8AD0B520121114 [https://perma.
cc/6AYK-RL6T]; CHRISTIAN AID, THE SCORCHED EARTH: OIL AND WAR IN SUDAN 6 (2001),
http://www.ecosonline.org/reports/2001/Thescorchedearth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DL56VZBY].
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B. Security
When confronting situations of State fragility, corporations
face a series of choices in terms of how they order their business operations. Sometimes the company finds itself in the midst of upheaval, having made its initial investment under conditions of peace and
stability that have subsequently deteriorated. The business must then
decide whether to stay or leave. Indeed, when internal revolution and
foreign-backed regime change swept through Libya in 2011, the Italian energy company Eni had to make exactly this sort of choice. Eni
had been present in Libya since 1959 and, despite the challenges that
the upheaval represented and subsequent security setbacks, the company has maintained its Libyan operations through an increased security presence to ensure the safety of its equipment and employees. 53
In other cases, companies will enter difficult settings because
they have calculated that the risk present is tolerable given the potential profit. Thus, for example, APR Energy not only entered enthusiastically into the Libyan market after the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi, but also decided to expand its intended power output
significantly in 2013. 54 Eventually the company was forced to aban53. See Eni SpA, Annual Report (S.E.C. Form 20-F) 16 (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.eni.com/docs/en_IT/enicom/publications-archive/publications/reports/reports2016/Annual-Report-On-Form-20-F-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJK3-MKK9] (“In 2011,
Eni’s operations in Libya were materially affected by an internal revolution and a change of
regime, which has led to a prolonged period of political and social instability characterized
by acts of local conflict, social unrest, protests, strikes and other similar events. Those
political developments forced Eni to temporarily interrupt or reduce its producing activities,
negatively affecting Eni’s results of operations and cash flow until the situation began to
stabilize. Although the Group’s production levels in Libya have returned to levels prior to
the outbreak of the civil war, the geopolitical situation remains unstable and unpredictable.
In 2016, Eni’s production in Libya was 346 kboe/day, the highest level since the outbreak of
the civil war, which represented approximately 20% of the Group’s total production for the
year.”).
54. See APR ENERGY, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 35, http://quote.morningstar.com/
stock-filing/Annual-Report/2012/12/31/t.aspx?t=:APRYY&ft=&d=
16bfe41a2f23e82e278d2854c217010e [https://perma.cc/MRT4-ABGL] (“We exited 2012
strongly. . . . This momentum has continued into 2013, with the signing of three new
contracts in Libya, Guatemala, and Indonesia. . . . The Libya win represents the largest
single contract in APR Energy history.”); Esha Vaish, APR Energy Quits Libya as
Government Fails to Ratify Contract, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/
article/apr-energy-libya-idUSL6N0V51RK20150126
[https://perma.cc/QX9D-6CW5]
(noting that “Libya accounted for about a quarter of the company’s total sales of $308
million in 2013 and was instrumental in the company turning a profit that year. In June
2013, the size of the contract was increased to 450 megawatts from 250 megawatts” and that
“Jacksonville, Florida-based APR’s focus on emerging markets has left it exposed to
political risk in countries such as Libya, where rival governments vie for control of vast
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don these plans and leave Libya, citing the deteriorating security situation and the impossibility of conducting audits on operations
there. 55
If the business decides to stay, it must then ensure that its employees are safe and provide for their basic needs. Companies often
contract with security firms (either based locally or from elsewhere)
to guard their staff, compound, offices, and installations. 56 An industry has grown up around the provision of basic security for businesses operating in fragile situations where the State is unable to ensure
safety. 57
It is unfortunate, but perhaps not surprising, that here one
finds some of the most significant human rights concerns expressed
with respect to corporations operating in fragile States. Yet, these
concerns are often encountered and arguably inherent when violence
is used to enforce some notion of order. Indeed, when the State deploys violence to ensure its hegemony and compel submission, the
potential for human rights abuses increases even in the most developed countries. 58 However, the attention on corporations deploying
energy fields more than three years after veteran leader Muammar Gaddafi was
overthrown.”).
55. See
APR
ENERGY,
ANNUAL
REPORT
2014,
at
9–10,
http://quote.morningstar.com/stock-filing/Annual-Report/2014/12/31/t.aspx?t=:APRYY&ft=
&d=880e5c3aa8b54bf563c59cef76c6d936 [https://perma.cc/EMX3-YDZ3] (“Towards the
end of 2014, we made the difficult decision to suspend operations in Libya, followed by our
announcement in January of this year to exit the country. The withdrawal has had a
significant, detrimental effect on the underlying profitability of our business. . . . Adding to
this complexity, the security situation in Libya, as well as in Yemen, has prevented our
auditors from physically verifying assets in these jurisdictions.” The Report also observes
that “[a]t the time we entered Libya, it was a historic contract to win and a testament to our
ability to deploy rapidly large blocks of power in an incredibly challenging operational
environment. . . . From the time we won the contract, we began producing power in just 90
days. Also, it was an attractive contract that produced significant revenues, margin and cash
flow for us, coupled with a customer who greatly valued the power we produced.”).
56. See HANNAH TONKIN, STATE CONTROL OVER PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY
COMPANIES IN ARMED CONFLICT 30–31 (2011); Kevin O’Brien, What Should and What
Should Not Be Regulated?, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION
OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 29, 37–41 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds.,
2007).
57. See Ernest Harsch, Building a State for the Congolese People, AFR. RENEWAL (Jan.
2008), http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2008/building-state-congolesepeople [https://perma.cc/4L9S-GH43] (noting that “private security outfits are common in
the main cities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], hired mostly by foreign and
local businesses to protect their property and keep crime at bay” because “regular police
forces . . . are not yet able to guarantee public safety”).
58. See generally PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017).
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such violence seems to focus not only on the acts but also on the lack
of legitimacy for such undertakings. Yet, one might easily question
the legitimacy of a range of State uses of violence and, as such, these
concerns are not necessarily unique to corporations. 59
Alternatively, or in parallel with hiring their own security
contractors, companies sometimes simply pay whichever group controls the territory in which they operate (whether government or insurgent fighters) to buy protection for their employees and physical
assets. Such payments often draw international ire and may render
the corporation complicit in a range of abuses. For example, facing
an ever-changing security landscape in Syria, the world’s largest cement manufacturer, LaFarge, made financial payments to several different groups (including sanctioned entities) to protect the staff and
assets at its concrete plant in the country. 60 The company subsequently apologized but noted that its local managers did what they
could to ensure continuity and safety. 61
Companies have also played an active role in ensuring compliance with international law by other actors in fragile States. In
Myanmar, for example, the large transnational energy company Total
E&P “took steps to make its Myanmar stakeholders more aware of
the rules governing security and human rights in the regions where it
is operating” and effectively “leveraged its relationship with the
59. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 722 (2d
ed. 2006) (noting that “[a] further problem lies in the assumption that ‘State failure’ arises
from weakness and anarchy rather than overweening strength” since “[t]he evils of the last
century were overwhelmingly due to strong regimes, and to their aftermath when eventually
they collapsed.”).
60. See Media Release, LafargeHolcim, LafargeHolcim Responds to Syria Review
(Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.lafargeholcim.com/LafargeHolcim-responds-syria-review
[https://perma.cc/24LH-R2L8]; Media Release, LafargeHolcim, LafargeHolcim Concludes
Independent Investigation into Legacy Syria Operations and Issues Summary of
Investigation Findings (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.lafargeholcim.com/summary-syriainvestigation-findings [https://perma.cc/9L5Y-6YDM].
61. See Liz Alderman, Lafarge Scandal Points to Difficulty for Businesses in War
Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/business/lafargeceo-syria-cement.html [https://perma.cc/YM5K-V8ML]; Dorothée Myriam Kellou, Le jeu
dangereux de LaFarge en Syrie, LE MONDE (Nov. 12, 2016), http://www.lemonde.fr/
international/article/2016/11/12/le-jeu-dangereux-de-lafarge-en-syrie_5030048_3210.html
[https://perma.cc/PL5K-EHM6] (“Je pensais au début qu’il était tout à fait acceptable
d’avoir des relations avec l’EIIL et d’autres groupes islamistes radicaux, car il nous fallait
être en relation avec les groupes en situation de pouvoir.”). See also Dorothée Myriam
Kellou et al., Syrie: les troubles arrangements de Lafarge avec l’Etat islamique, LE MONDE
(June
21,
2016),
http://www.lemonde.fr/syrie/article/2016/06/21/syrie-les-troublesarrangements-de-lafarge-avec-l-etat-islamique_4955023_1618247.html
[https://perma.cc/
E5N4-GWRN].
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Government” to convince the State to join the international Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. 62 Moreover, the company undertook “human rights training of its employees with the Danish Institute of Human Rights and the ILO [International Labour
Organization] on good labour practices, with a focus on forced labour, to raise awareness of the population on their rights.” 63
Furthermore, because conflict is often tied either to economic
deprivation or to disputes over the distribution of economic resources, the private sector plays an important role in reintegrating exsoldiers by providing an alternative livelihood to conflict. 64 And,
business actors have played a crucial role in negotiating an end to the
civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala and to a resolution to the
ongoing State dysfunction in Somalia. 65
C. Other Quasi-Governmental Tasks
Ensuring security in times of upheaval is a particularly difficult objective for those companies that stay, but the discussion of the
State-like functions of corporations ought not to stop there. Some
companies do much more for their employees.
These enterprises also ensure housing, food, water, and access
to healthcare for employees stationed in the compounds that the
company maintains on their behalf, constructing an immediate world
for their employees that is intended to be safe and relatively hospitable.
Thus, when the Florida-based electricity company APR Energy set out to construct and run electricity generation plants in remote
areas of Libya after the fall of Colonel Gaddafi’s regime, it also established “man camps with living, eating, sleeping, bathing, and
laundry facilities to house workers.” 66 Moreover, in its quest to exploit oil deposits in South Sudan, the China National Petroleum Corporation has built and provisioned similar compounds for its employ62. WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 41, at 20.
63. Id.
64. Allan Gerson, Peace Building: The Private Sector’s Role, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 102,
105–07 (2001).
65. CANAN GUNDUZ, INT’L ALERT, LOCAL BUSINESS, LOCAL PEACE: THE
PEACEBUILDING POTENTIAL OF THE DOMESTIC PRIVATE SECTOR 324–63, 469–503 (Jessica
Banfield & Nick Killick eds., 2006), http://www.international-alert.org/publications/localbusiness-local-peace [https://perma.cc/7MME-59ZL].
66. TECH. REV. MID. EAST, ANNUAL POWER REVIEW 2014, at 26, https://issuu.com/
alaincharles/docs/trme_power_2014_final [https://perma.cc/Q7YL-7LU7].
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ees stationed in the country. 67 Indeed, many companies that do business in extractive industries are compelled to operate such camps for
their employees because the deposits they seek are sometimes situated in fragile States and the exploration and infrastructure investments
necessary to initiate such operations are deemed too valuable to
abandon. 68
Moreover, in order to ensure that a particular locality prospers
commercially, some companies will take on other governmental
functions viewed as essential. Thus, for example, in the eastern part
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, various business groups have
joined together to build new roads and ensure their maintenance
through the collection of local taxes. 69
Other businesses have exploited the absence of the State as
the central part of their profit model. Thus, in Syria, DHL delivers
parcels to areas of the conflict-wracked country where the official
mail system cannot, exploiting opportunities for profit and providing
a public service beyond the State’s current capacity. 70 Similarly, in
67. See China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (July
10, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/288-china-s-foreignpolicy-experiment-south-sudan [https://perma.cc/P92D-PNJT]; China’s New Courtship in
South Sudan, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/hornafrica/south-sudan/china-s-new-courtship-south-sudan [https://perma.cc/RTU9-P643]. See
generally LUKE PATEY, THE NEW KINGS OF CRUDE: CHINA, INDIA, AND THE GLOBAL
STRUGGLE FOR OIL IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN (2014); LAURA M. JAMES, SMALL ARMS
SURVEY, FIELDS OF CONTROL: OIL AND (IN)SECURITY IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN 19–24
(2015),
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBAWP40-Oil.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5BP-9N6P]; JILL SHANKLEMAN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, OIL
AND STATE BUILDING IN SOUTH SUDAN (2011), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/
files/Oil_and_State_Building_South_Sudan.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP9Q-NVCY].
68. See PETER D. CAMERON & MICHAEL C. STANLEY, WORLD BANK GROUP, OIL, GAS,
MINING: A SOURCEBOOK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 242
(2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/222451496911224999/pdf/115792-PUBPUBLIC-PUBDATE-6-6-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEE2-9BRL] (noting that “extractives
operations have all too often acquired an ‘enclave’ character.”).

AND

69. E-mail
from
Nathan
Smith,
Anti-Corruption
Project
Manager,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Dem. Rep. Congo (Aug. 24, 2017) (on file with author).
70. See DHL Express Import Guidelines: Syria, DHL, http://www.dhl.com.sy/
en/country_profile/import_guidelines_express.html [https://perma.cc/73ML-WT5K]; What’s
the Story, Ms. Halaby?: Business as Unusual, DELIVERED: THE GLOBAL LOGISTICS MAG.,
Nov. 2016, http://www.delivered.dhl.com/en/articles/2016/11/whats-the-story-ms-halaby.
html [https://perma.cc/REZ9-GS46]; Alice Fordham, Syrian President Issues New Stamps,
But Can’t Deliver the Mail, NPR (July 24, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/
parallels/2014/07/24/332249724/syrian-president-issues-new-stamps-but-cant-deliver-themail [https://perma.cc/9GUR-5BZ2]. For advisories from the U.S. and U.K. mail services
advising on the lack of mail delivery in Syria, see USPS Service Alerts, U.S. POSTAL SERV.,
https://about.usps.com/news/service-alerts/welcome.htm
[https://perma.cc/6FXC-824M];
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Yemen, both FedEx and Western Union ensure the delivery of mail
and the transfer of money through a local logistics firm, Griffin. 71
And Aggreko, one of the largest sellers of power generators, maintains retail operations in settings of upheaval, including Somalia,
Yemen, and Libya, so as to allow other businesses to continue operating in areas lacking stable electrical supplies. 72
Further, some firms assist States grappling with the consequences of regional instability, in a way helping to prevent these
neighboring States from themselves collapsing. The Syrian Civil
War, for example, has forced over 5.6 million people to flee to other
countries in the region, principally Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq,
and Egypt. 73 These States have in turn voiced their concerns loudly
as to the financial and systemic challenges of absorbing so many refugees and the politically destabilizing potential of such influxes. 74
In response, the Swedish-founded, Dutch-headquartered furPersonal Customers Help Centre, ROYAL MAIL, https://personal.help.royalmail.com/app/
answers/detail/a_id/5317/~/international-incidents-update [https://perma.cc/8E85-8ES4].
71. See FedEx Services in Yemen, GRIFFIN, http://www.griffin-ltd.com/griffin_fedex_
yemen.html [https://perma.cc/254E-SK9H]; Falcon Exchange Co. A Griffin Ltd. Company,
FALCON EXCH., http://www.falcon-ex.com/about.html [https://perma.cc/95BF-4AH4].
72. See Mark Leftly, Aggreko Counts the Cost of Turmoil in Libya and Yemen,
EVENING STANDARD (May 14, 2015), https://www.standard.co.uk/business/businessnews/aggreko-counts-the-cost-of-turmoil-in-libya-and-yemen-10250479.html
[https://perma.cc/YCH6-UALV] (observing that “[s]ecurity threats in Libya and Yemen
have hit trading at Aggreko, the company that hires out power generators and temperaturecontrol equipment around the world has said”).
73. Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Syrian Regional Response, U.N. HIGH
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (June 24, 2018), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria
[https://perma.cc/3RST-TYET].
74. Mulqi: Jordan’s Capacities Maxed Out on Syrian Refugee Crisis, ALGHAD (Apr.
5, 2017), http://www.alghad.com/articles/1535872-Mulqi-Jordan%E2%80%99s-CapacitiesMaxed-Out-on-Syrian-Refugee-Crisis [https://perma.cc/M5HD-HKER]; Refugee Burden
Has Exhausted Jordan—Judeh, JORDAN TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.
jordantimes.com/news/local/refugee-burden-has-exhausted-jordan-%E2%80%94-judeh
[https://perma.cc/PP4W-2KJB]; Stephen Brown, Syria’s Neighbours Risk ‘Host-Country
Fatigue,’ Conference Hears, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2014), https://uk.reuters.com/article/ukmideast-crisis-refugees/syrias-neighbours-risk-host-country-fatigue-conference-hearsidUKKBN0IH0WB20141028 [https://perma.cc/77XG-GV2R]; Missy Ryan, Syria Refugee
Crisis Poses Major Threat to Lebanese Stability: U.N., REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2014), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-usa/syria-refugee-crisis-poses-major-threat-to-lebanesestability-u-n-idUSBREA2R02E20140328 [https://perma.cc/3UJ9-EDL9] (quoting Ninette
Kelley, regional representative for Lebanon for the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, as stating that “[i]f this country is not bolstered, then the very
real prospect of it collapsing and the conflict of Syria spreading full force to Lebanon
becomes much more likely”).
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niture company Ikea mobilized through its own foundation to assist
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) to
support these displaced persons. 75 To be sure, Ikea has not always
been a model of enlightened corporate conduct. 76 Yet, the company
clearly recognized in the refugee crisis an opportunity for constructive intervention. Indeed, while also putting the company’s own
branding on their efforts and continually emphasizing its mission to
improve interior design the world over, Ikea has become UNHCR’s
largest private sector partner. 77 The company has provided over
10,000 new, more durable shelter units for refugee families in the region, and these so-called “flat pack” shelters include innovations like
a front door that locks and solar power to fuel the families’ electronics. 78 The shelters won the London Design Museum’s Beazley Design of the Year award, but had to be redesigned subsequently due to
concerns over fire safety. 79
In spite of this significant challenge, Ikea has been at the fore-

75. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR CORPORATE PARTNERSHIPS
PROGRAMME: IKEA FOUNDATION, http://www.unhcr.org/partners/partners/54cb9e8f9/unhcrikea-foundation-partnership-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/GW7Y-VADJ].
76. Nicholas Kulish & Julia Werdigier, Ikea Admits Forced Labor Was Used in 1980s,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/business/global/ikea-toreport-on-allegations-of-using-forced-labor-during-cold-war.html [https://perma.cc/7RG4WYEM] (observing that Ikea had “admitted that political prisoners in the former East
Germany provided some of the labor that helped it keep its prices so low”).
77. Ikea Foundation, U.N. HIGH COMM’R
foundation.html [https://perma.cc/JSC8-GJXU].

FOR

REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/ikea-

78. See Dan Howarth, IKEA’s Flat-Pack Refugee Shelters Go into Production, DEZEEN
(Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.dezeen.com/2015/03/24/ikea-flat-pack-refugee-shelters-gointo-production-better-shelter-unhcr/ [https://perma.cc/UX6T-7LFV]. Cf. Elizabeth Cullen
Dunn, Better Than a Tent, Worse Than a House: Ikea’s Flat-Pack Shelters for Refugees
May Make Life More Comfortable. But They Won’t Solve Any Problems, SLATE (Oct. 1,
2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/10/ikea_gives_10_000_
flat_pack_shelters_for_refugees.html [https://perma.cc/K4FD-RKZH].
79. Oliver Wainwright, Why Ikea’s Flatpack Refugee Shelter Won Design of the Year,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/jan/27/whyikea-flatpack-refugee-shelter-won-design-of-the-year [https://perma.cc/XL67-4UJJ]; Maya
Rhodan, Ikea Refugee Shelter Wins Design of the Year Award, FORTUNE (Jan. 30, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/01/30/ikea-refugee-shelter-beazley/
[https://perma.cc/6WDFUDDA]; Marcus Fairs, Ikea Refugee Shelter to be Redesigned Following Safety Fears and
Design Flaws, DEZEEN (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.dezeen.com/2017/04/27/ikea-unhcrrefugee-better-shelter-redesign-safety-fears-flaws/ [https://perma.cc/P225-2C6E]; Marcus
Fairs, Ten Thousand IKEA Refugee Shelters Left Unused Over Fire Fears, United Nations
Admits, DEZEEN (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.dezeen.com/2017/04/29/united-nationsadmits-10000-ikea-better-shelter-refugees-mothballed-fire-fears/ [https://perma.cc/XGV2KC5N].
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front of increasing awareness in the developed world concerning refugee issues, raising over thirty million euros for UNHCR through a
campaign to donate one euro for each LED light sold in its stores,
building the first renewable energy-powered refugee camp in Jordan
and utilizing Syrian refugee workers in its supply chains so as to improve their employment opportunities. 80 Moreover, Ikea has also
worked diligently to assist refugees outside Syria, partnering with the
UNHCR in Libya, Chad, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and South Sudan to
improve basic services and accommodations available in refugee
camps. 81 Further, in its latest initiative, the company has begun to
hire hundreds (with plans to hire thousands) of Syrian refugees in
Jordan to manufacture rugs. 82 Other companies have followed suit,
opening training classes in the IT sector to educate and eventually
hire a new group of tech specialists from among the Syrian refugee
population in Jordan. 83
There are also instances when a corporation exercises such
complete control over an area of territory and its employees therein
80. Brighter Lives for Refugees, IKEA, https://www.ikea.com/gb/en/this-isikea/people-planet/people-communities/good-cause-campaigns/brighter-lives-for-refugees/
[https://perma.cc/K38Q-4TTP]; Marcus Fairs, IKEA Aims to Take 200,000 People Out of
Poverty in Massive Social Sustainability Drive, DEZEEN (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.
dezeen.com/2017/04/18/ikea-massive-social-sustainability-drive-production-centresrefugee-camps-jordan/ [https://perma.cc/7XJM-EKKX]; Azraq, the World’s First Refugee
Camp Powered by Renewable Energy, Joint UNHCR/IKEA Found., U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR
REFUGEES (May 17, 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2017/5/591c079e4/azraqworlds-first-refugee-camp-powered-renewable-energy.html [https://perma.cc/R967-8DET];
Charlotte Edmon, The World’s First Refugee Camp Powered by Renewable Energy, WORLD
ECON. FORUM (June 13, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/the-world-s-firstsolar-powered-refugee-camp/ [https://perma.cc/W6E2-9BAG]; Rachel England, How Ikea
Helped to Change Attitudes on Helping Refugees, INDEPENDENT (May 28, 2017),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/ikea-refugees-help-shelters-attitudeeurope-company-middle-east-syria-a7742576.html [https://perma.cc/8KDD-U89X].
81. UNHCR Corporate Partnerships Programme: IKEA Foundation, U.N. HIGH
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/partners/partners/54cb9e8f9/unhcr-ikeafoundation-partnership-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/VE4N-JBYW]; Altaf Makhiawal,
Refugee Self-Reliance in Africa Boosted by IKEA Foundation Support: UNHCR’s Largest
Private Sector Partner Supports Refugee Families and Host Communities in Ethiopia and
Burkina Faso, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (July 9, 2015), http://www.unhcr.
org/news/latest/2015/7/559e919f9/refugee-self-reliance-africa-boosted-ikea-foundationsupport.html [https://perma.cc/DV8D-K3LK].
82. John Reed & Richard Milne, Ikea to Provide Jobs for Syrian Refugees in New
Jordanian Project, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/35cb00ce-e6ed11e6-893c-082c54a7f539 [https://perma.cc/8PAF-XM83]; Fairs, supra note 80.
83. Venetia Rainey, Coding Classes Open New Doors for Syrian Good Refugees, AL
JAZEERA (Oct. 22, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/coding-classes-opendoors-syrian-refugees-161022080625712.html [https://perma.cc/QB5F-RZQH].
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that the business may be understood as a sort of micro- or nascent
State. Indeed, the popular press has consistently referred to Firestone’s 220-square-mile rubber plantation in Liberia as a “State within a State.” 84 Firestone runs its own schools for employees’ families,
operates several health clinics, runs its own hospital, employs its own
security force, provides housing, clean water, and subsidized food,
and has, at times, even run its own magistrate’s court to administer
justice. 85
Firestone is not alone. The steel giant ArcelorMittal has operated a similarly vast plant in Liberia for the last decade through
which it has also had to provide for its thousands of employees as
though they were its citizens. 86 And, like Firestone, ArcelorMittal
deployed an advanced and rapid strategy to combat the growing
threat of Ebola in the surrounding community. 87 Thus, though its
principal iron ore mining concession is situated in one of the worstimpacted counties, the company suffered only one fatality during the
entirety of the outbreak. 88
Despite a fizzle of publicity at the time of the Ebola outbreak,
the activities of both Firestone and ArcelorMittal in combating this
pandemic have gone largely unconsidered by scholars of international law. The next section considers the development of international
legal scholarship concerning failed and fragile States, the conventional perception of the place of corporations, and the previous utilization of the corporate form in projects of colonial conquest and im84. See, e.g., Nicholas Jahr, Workers Organize at Firestone, Liberia’s ‘State Within a
State,’ THE NATION (July 8, 2010), https://www.thenation.com/article/workers-organizefirestone-liberias-state-within-state/ [https://perma.cc/CE83-LUQH]; Dan Morgan, Firestone
Efficiency Shadows Liberian Problems, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 1979), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/03/07/firestone-efficiency-shadows-liberianproblems/4c547e5e-b372-490a-a5c3-c19717206492/?utm_term=.d17b36407a10
[https://
perma.cc/3WZK-JHU6]. See also WILLIAM ROSENAU ET AL., RAND CORP, CORPORATIONS
AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 17–23 (2009), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP259.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2U5-7MJQ].
85. See ROSENAU, supra note 84, at 17–23; DANIEL E. LEE & ELIZABETH J. LEE,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 115–41 (2010); Morgan, supra note 84.
86. See GLOBAL WITNESS, HEAVY MITTAL?: A STATE WITHIN A STATE 52–55 (2006),
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/16825/mittal_steel_en_oct_2006_high_res.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4T2R-QBFW].
87. Erika Fry, Business in the Time of Ebola, FORTUNE (Oct. 30, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/10/30/arcelormittal-business-liberia-ebola-outbreak/ [https://perma.
cc/PFQ5-6ML5].
88. Liberia: Responding to Ebola, ARCELORMITTAL, http://corporate.arcelormittal.
com/sustainability/snapdown-hub/health-liberia-responding-to-ebola
[https://perma.cc/
TQ85-9FV3].
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perial exploitation as factors underlying that perception.
II. MISSED CONNECTIONS
Given the rich variation of commercial activity in fragile
States discussed in Part I, it may be surprising that such activities are
not more extensively publicized or written about. Yet, firms may be
wary that their demonstrated capacity will eventually lead to the general imposition of legal obligations that would remove decisionmaking in such contexts from the sole purview of the company’s
management and instead entrust it to international officials or civil
society activists. 89
Indeed, if it is generally known that Firestone was more effective in limiting the spread of Ebola than the Liberian State, it may be
that popular calls will grow to ensure such outcomes going forward
for the population at large. Activists might then also demand that
corporations not merely respect the most basic guarantees of human
rights law and refrain from violations but also ensure the provision of
positive socio-economic rights to the communities where they operate. 90
Various business organizations have already issued statements rejecting the imposition of any direct, quasi-State obligations
on corporations under international law. Indeed, when John Ruggie,
the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative on the Issue of
Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, and other Business Entities, first solicited business comment on his project to formulate
guidelines with respect to business and human rights, the International Organization of Employers (“IOE”) and the International Chamber
of Commerce (“ICC”) issued a statement reiterating that, with respect
to human rights, “[g]overnments. . .are the primary duty bearers under international law” and that “[b]usiness can never be, nor should it
be expected to become, a surrogate government.” 91
89. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, JOINT VIEWS OF THE IOE AND ICC ON THE
DRAFT “NORMS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS” (2004) (expressing concern at the
possible imposition of international human rights obligations on business actors).
90. See Nien-hê Hsieh, Should Business Have Human Rights Obligations?, 14 J.
HUM. RTS. 218, 223 (2015).
91. Business and Human Rights: The Role of Business in Weak Governance Zones,
INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS ¶ 9 (2006), https://www.business-humanrights.org//sites/default/files/
reports-and-materials/Role-of-Business-in-Weak-Governance-Zones-Dec-2006.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BB2K-K2VB].
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Yet, despite the forcefulness of the IOE/ICC pronouncement,
Part I illustrates that business sometimes stands in the gap in failing
States, discharging public functions when the State cannot.
The section to come examines why legal scholars may not
have more closely interrogated such business activities previously,
particularly given the fairly voluminous literature regarding State-led
humanitarian intervention and the security threat posed by fragile
States more generally. This section suggests that the historically
State-centric orientation of international law scholarship and the significant involvement of firms in now long-discredited colonial endeavors have contributed to the relative dearth of legal literature
grappling with the potential of firms in failed States as constructive
actors.
A. Disciplinary Estrangement and the Long Shadow of Colonial
Corporations
Transnational corporations have historically posed a conundrum for international lawyers. 92 These faceless entities, endowed
with legal personality by the domestic law of their country of incorporation, have now come to possess greater wealth and power than
many States. 93 Yet, only States have customarily been designated as
92. See Jenny S. Martinez, New Territorialism and Old Territorialism, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 1387, 1412 (2014) (arguing that “both public and private international law have not
adequately grappled with the problem of transnational regulation of large multinational
corporations, and that part of the reason for this failure is the heavy reliance of both fields on
concepts of territoriality and state-centric sovereignty,” such that the issue “evades a
completely satisfactory solution”); Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private
Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 802–03 (2002) (observing the persistence of
a “remarkable confusion” with respect to whether international human rights law applies to
private corporations); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving
International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 819 (2007) (“The state-based system of
global governance has struggled for more than a generation to adjust to the expanding reach
and growing influence of transnational corporations.”).
93. See Erika R. George, Incorporating Rights: Empire, Global Enterprise, and
Global Justice, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 917, 926 (2013) (noting that “[n]early half of the
world’s largest economic entities are corporations, not countries” and that “[c]ommercial
enterprises have relative clout in the international arena and revenues that often eclipse the
GDPs of sovereign states in which they operate”); Erika R. George, The Enterprise of
Empire: Evolving Understandings of Corporate Identity and Responsibility, in THE
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 19, 20 (Jena
Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds., 2016) (observing that “some large multinational corporations
possess a global influence to rival that of some countries”); Jonathan I. Charney,
Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748,
768 (declaring that “[n]ation-states aside, TNCs [transnational corporations] are the most
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subjects of international law, with corporations regulated indirectly,
by their home State. 94
However, corporations have been present and central since
the birth of international law as a discipline. 95 Indeed, it has almost
become commonplace to observe that Hugo Grotius, often regarded
as the father of modern international law, was himself counsel to the
Dutch East India Company. 96 And, in this role, his promotion of the
principle of the freedom of the high seas was, in part, a self-interested
exercise in order to ensure the security and efficacy of the company’s
trading routes. 97
Moreover, European States frequently deployed business organizations to extend State power and build out the province of empire. 98 The pursuit of trading opportunities (and thereby the initiation
powerful actors in the world today and to not recognize that power would be unrealistic”).
94. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (7th ed. 2014) (noting that
“[d]espite the increasing range of actors and participants in the international legal system,
states remain by far the most important legal persons and despite the rise of globalisation
and all that this entails, states retain their attraction as the primary focus for the social
activity of humankind and thus for international law”); 2 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 489 (Elihu
Lauterpacht, ed., 1975); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 37–38 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); José E.
Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1
(2011); John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 47 (2008); Steven
R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE
L.J. 443 (2001). But see Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV.
1573, 1574–75 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he old understanding of international law as
something created solely by and for sovereigns is defunct” and that “[t]oday the production
and enforcement of international law increasingly depends on private actors, not traditional
political authorities. As with other public services that we used to take for granted—schools,
prisons, energy utilities, and transportation and telecommunication networks—privatization
has come to international law.”).
95. See José-Manuel Barreto, Cerberus: Rethinking Grotius and the Westphalian
System, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EMPIRE: HISTORICAL EXPLORATIONS 149, 149 (Martti
Koskenniemi et al. eds., 2017) (arguing that “international law does not only regulate the
relations between nation states” but that “[s]ince its very inception, modern international law
has regulated the dealings between states, empires and companies”); George, Enterprise of
Empire, supra note 93, at 30–48.
96. See, e.g., MARTINE JULIA VAN ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE: HUGO GROTIUS,
NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES AND THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST INDIES (1595–1615)
(2006).
97. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, The Grotius Lecture: International Law in a Time of
Change: Should International Law Lead or Follow?, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1315, 1319
(2011); John T. Parry, What is the Grotian Tradition in International Law?, 35 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 299, 326–27, 337 (2013).
98. See Philip J. Stern, The English East India Company and the Modern Corporation:
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of projects of human exploitation and resource plunder) motivated
territorial expansion, but acting through corporate entities allowed
the State a lower-risk and less-costly way of undertaking such endeavors. 99 Indeed, when the Western State lacked capacity, it turned
to private actors to fill the gap. 100 Thus, the deployment of privateers, distinguished from pirates mainly by the letters of marque they
carried and their commitment to attack only the vessels of certain
States, was a common technique to extend State power. 101 Similarly,
American corporations operating in Latin America often enjoyed tacit and sometimes overt support from the U.S. government when these
business actors would interfere in the governmental affairs of the
States in which they conducted business. 102
Yet, by the twentieth century, the scholarly relationship between corporations and international law was as that of two old
friends who had drifted apart. 103 International law had, by then,
come to be understood as the exclusive province of the State, whereas corporations were still largely conceptualized as creatures of domestic law, neither bound directly by nor able themselves to create
international legal obligations. 104 Accordingly, many treaties that set
out obligations for corporate actors did so, and continue to do so,
through the vehicle of indirect regulation undertaken by the corporation’s home State. 105 The question of whether corporations are apLegacies, Lessons, and Limitations, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 423 (2016); A.J. GRANT ET AL.,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 90–91 (1916) (noting that
“[i]n India, for example, the flag followed trade” and that “[i]nternal disorder in the country
drove the Company [British East India Company] to protect itself by gradually developing a
system of administration, the Company taking upon itself important functions of government
and becoming a quasi-state”).
99. See STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 33–37
(2007). See also MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS 111–12, 116–
21 (2001). See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
100. See PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 7 (2011) (asserting that
“[l]egally and conceptually speaking, the early modern national state and even the monarch
herself were forms of corporation”).
101. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s
Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 210 (2004).
102. See Martinez, supra note 92, at 1403–07.
103. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 37–38 (Feb. 5).
104. Id.
105. Carlos M. Vazquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under
International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927, 930 (2005) (observing that
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propriately to be regarded as subjects of international law and thus
bound by international legal obligations has triggered a long-running
debate. 106
Over successive decades, transnational legal scholars like
Philip Jessup, 107 Detlev Vagts, 108 Harold Koh, 109 and Anne-Marie
Slaughter 110 have drawn attention to international law’s stultified focus on the State as the sole actor of import in the global community
and critiqued this practice as artificial and false. As such, these
scholars contributed substantially to the development of the field of
International Business Transactions as an area of scholarly inquiry so
as to engage with transnational interchange or global private ordering
through and beyond the State. 111 However, even in some recent
scholarship examining the role of corporate interests in the production of international law, a certain hostility to the engagement of
“[i]nternational law, as it exists today, includes norms that address the conduct of
corporations and other non-state actors, but, with every few exceptions, the norms do so by
imposing an obligation on states to regulate non-state actors,” such that “for the most part,
international law regulates such non-state actors indirectly”). The tripartite structure of the
International Labour Organization, which includes representatives of States, employers, and
workers in its Governing Body is the rare exception to this rule. See INT’L LABOR ORG.
CONSTITUTION, art. 7, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_
LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO#A7 [https://perma.cc/RA66-ZL33].
106. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (7th ed. 2014) (observing
that “[t]he question of the international personality of transnational corporations remains an
open one”); Rebecca M. Bratspies, “Organs of Society”: A Plea for Human Rights
Accountability for Transnational Enterprises and Other Business Entities, 13 MICH. ST. J.
INT’L L. 9, 11 (2005) (noting that “[b]ecause TNEs [transnational business enterprises]
operate across national borders, beyond the constraints of any one nation’s domestic law,
their actions are too often viewed as beyond the reach of any law” and that “[t]his unique
ability to elude national legal systems makes TNEs ripe for greater investigation under
international law”).
107. See generally PHILLIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).
108. See Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise:
Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 789–91 (1970).

A New Challenge for

109. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2624–29 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75
NEB. L. REV. 181, 184–85 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 746 (2005).
110. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 227–28 (1993). See generally ANNEMARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
111. See Mathias Reimann, From the Law of Nations to Transnational Law: Why We
Need a New Basic Course for the International Curriculum, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 397,
412–13 (2004). See also Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change,
37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 233–35 (2012).
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business actors is apparent. 112
In line with this trajectory, the legacy of international law’s
statist focus is particularly palpable in the scholarship concerning
failed and fragile States. 113 Indeed, that literature largely excludes
business actors. The prevailing scholarly approach seems instead to
start from the premise that because State failure is a breakdown in the
basic unit of international governance, it is for other actors in this
category (States or groups of States, namely international organizations) to respond to such challenges. States fix broken States and so
the possible constructive functions of corporations are minimized and
obscured. 114
International institutions have begun to take note of and build
upon the quasi-State functions discharged by some of the businesses
discussed in Part I, 115 but most scholarship has lagged behind. 116
112. See Melissa J. Durkhee, Astroturf Activism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 201 (2017). See also
Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229 (2015).
113. See supra note 94; see also supra note 103.
114. John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CAL. L. REV. 95, 98 (2011) (“[N]ation-states
remain the most important actors with the capacity to fix failed states. . . . Removing
obstacles in international law and policy to intervention in failed state will more effectively
allow nation-states to tackle the problem.”).
115. See U.N. GLOB. COMPACT, supra note 29, at 6 (observing that “[t]he primary
responsibility for peace, security and development rests with governments, but the private
sector can make a meaningful contribution to stability and security in conflict-affected and
high-risk areas”); Peschka, supra note 37, at 3–7 (noting that “the private sector continues to
operate even during the most violent situations” and that “in places like Somalia, Sudan, and
Afghanistan, the lack of any effective central government presence may lead the local
private sector to provide services normally expected from the government”); AFRICAN DEV.
BANK GRP., supra note 25, at 22–25 (affirming that “[w]eak institutional capacity is a key
feature of fragile situations and significantly impairs the state’s ability to deliver public
goods and services. Along with efforts to strengthen public institutions, the Bank will
provide greater support for the use of non-state actors, notably the private sector and civil
society, in delivering the services within a public framework that places the state in a
regulatory and commissioning role.”).
116. See ZACHARIAH CHERIAN MAMPILLY, REBEL RULERS: INSURGENT GOVERNANCE
CIVILIAN LIFE DURING WAR 7 (2015) (describing the “state-centric tendency, especially
visible within political science studies of governance” as “understandable though
problematic, for it implies a basic Hobbesian conjecture—that is, if the state is not capable
of exerting control, then chaos must ensue,” such that “scholars thus far have not adequately
accounted for the performance of governmental functions by nonstate actors”). See also
IQBAL & STARR, supra note 27, at 125 (observing that “instead of limiting our attention to
intervention efforts by the United Nations and regional institutions, we could turn to how
private entities—such as multinational corporations—play [or might play] a role in keeping
states from collapsing: specifically, how that role could be better managed to have a positive
influence on fragile states with high risk of failure, rather than merely subjecting these
societies to the pernicious effects of the ‘dark side of globalization,’” but also admitting that
AND
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Some attention has been paid to private security firms and their actions in zones of weak governance, but little else is said of the potential of companies in shoring up the fragile State. 117 Though some
scholars have discussed the territorial administrative functions of international organizations with respect to States undergoing periods of
transition and upheaval, few have focused on business actors that
discharge similar tasks. 118
In parallel, several scholars have begun to think through how
other non-State actors, particularly rebel groups, perform State-like
functions in settings of State fragility. 119 But the objective of the actors at the core of these studies is to attain the status and power of the
State. Indeed, for the law of international responsibility, if these nonState actors obtain State power, their actions become attributable to

“[i]n the absence of extant large-scale analyses, we are not in a position to assert whether the
involvement of/with private entities would benefit a weak or failing state; we merely point to
it as a future direction for further investigation of the concept and phenomenon of state
failure.”).
117. See, e.g., LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING
PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011); Laura A. Dickinson,
Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 135 (2005); PETER SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003).
118. For notable exceptions, see Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The
Governance of Business Activities in Conflict Zones, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 324 (2010)
(arguing that “the norms governing businesses in conflict zones are both understudied and
undervalued—understudied because the focus is generally on human rights of universal
application, rather than the narrower regime of international humanitarian law [IHL], and
undervalued because IHL may provide a more certain foundation for real norms that can be
applied to businesses and the individuals who control them”); Jide Nzelibe, When the
Multinational Meets the Patrimonial State: Prospects for Improving Transnational
Liability, 5 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 417 (1996). On the phenomenon of territorial administration
by international organizations, see RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL
ADMINISTRATION: HOW TRUSTEESHIP AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION NEVER WENT AWAY
(2008); ERIC DE BRABANDERE, POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN
OCCUPATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 99–100 (2009); GREGORY H. FOX, HUMANITARIAN
OCCUPATION (2008); Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the
Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580 (2006).
119. See ZACHARIAH CHERIAN MAMPILLY, REBEL RULERS: INSURGENT GOVERNANCE
CIVILIAN LIFE DURING WAR (2011); José Ciro Martínez & Brent Eng, Struggling to
Perform the State: The Politics of Bread in the Syrian Civil War, 11 INT’L POL. SOC. 130
(2017) (describing the performance of the State through the provision of bread to civilians);
Double-Edged Sword: Vigilantes in African Counter-Insurgencies, INT’L CRISIS GROUP
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/sierra-leone/251-doubleedged-sword-vigilantes-african-counter-insurgencies [https://perma.cc/U6F7-WK5P].
AND
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the State itself. 120
Relatedly, the drive to treat corporations as subjects of international law amenable to suit for violations of international law is
premised on the belief that some governmental actor or source of
public authority must restrain business. Corporations, so this narrative proceeds with respect to fragile States, are often at least as powerful as the States in which they operate and so must be held accountable through international law when their actions cause harm
because of their tendency to do social harm when not restrained by
some governmental apparatus. 121
Thus, some scholars have argued as an alternative that corporations should be treated as subjects of international law (thereby accountable for violations of that body of law) when they act like the
State. 122 Still others have argued that corporations ought to be amenable to suit for violations of international law merely by virtue of
their wealth and influence, regardless of whether they are undertaking State-like or purely private tasks. 123
Yet, the common thread throughout this line of thinking is the
emphasis on the necessity of an accountability paradigm in framing
the interconnectedness of corporations, international law, and fragile
States. If national authorities either in the corporation’s home State
or in the territory of operation are unwilling or unable to hold the
corporation to account, it is for the superstructure of international law
to facilitate the enforcement of such legal sanctions. 124
120. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 art. 10(1) (Sept. 6, 2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA] (“The
conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government of a State shall
be considered an act of that State under international law.”).
121. Austen L. Parrish, Rehabilitating Territoriality in Human Rights, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1099, 1128 (2011) (arguing that “[s]trong territorial states are essential for effective
enforcement of human rights norms against multi-national and transnational corporations”).
122. See FLORIAN WETTSTEIN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE:
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTION (2009); Ratner,
supra note 94, 497–506.
123. See MARKOS KARAVIAS, CORPORATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 2–
3 (2013); David Weissbrodt & Maria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2003) (arguing that “[w]ith power should come responsibility”).
124. Anita Ramasastry, Corporation Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon—an
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational
Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 91, 118 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he issue of MNC
[multinational corporation] culpability should be assessed in terms of the level, degree and
duration of complicity, and the context in which that complicity occurs,” such that “MNCs
that work with repressive regimes today arguably present a stronger case for the imposition
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In contrast, the literature on corporate social responsibility
seeks to cultivate a consciousness of social reputation to motivate
business actors to do good through the pressure of consumer choice
and civil society activism. 125 Corporate social responsibility emphasizes the social reasons, particularly social pressure from consumers
and decisionmakers in more lucrative markets, for corporations to
contribute to economic development and the expansion of infrastructure and services in the places in which they operate. Yet, here again
an understanding of the necessity of an external constraint on the
pursuit of profit (here, social pressure rather than legal sanction) is
present. 126 This Article may be understood as an application of corporate social responsibility, but, as the analysis to come will seek to
demonstrate, the Article seeks to extend those insights further by examining situations where such external constraint has been largely
absent.
As a consequence of these parallel trends emphasizing legal
and social constraints on the private sector and the concomitant
communal pressure, business actors have agreed to join a variety of
codes of conduct and reporting mechanisms that represent understandings of international best practices in the area. 127 But here
of liability” because “such MNCs are acting purely for profit rather than out of the national
interest”).
125. See, e.g., Erika R. George & Scarlet R. Smith, In Good Company: How Corporate
Social Responsibility Can Protect Rights and Aid Efforts to End Child Sex Trafficking and
Modern Slavery, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 55, 58 (2013) (asserting that “corporate social
responsibility is becoming a competitive imperative as it informs the consumers’ decisions
to patronize an establishment and the investors’ decision to purchase shares in a particular
corporation” such that “conduct consistent with emerging global norms on the responsibility
of business to respect human rights is advisable”).
126. See, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 31, at 100–01 (noting that “[t]he ‘international
corporate social responsibility’ [ICSR] of MNEs [Multinational Enterprises] can be seen as a
response to popular perceptions concerning the loss of corporate accountability as an effect
of economic globalization”).
127. See, e.g., U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/N62V-ZLW4]; OECD, OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/
guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/L7VB-M3Y5]; INT’L LABOUR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (5th ed.
2017),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_emp/—-emp_ent/—-multi/
documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC3X-K3TM]. See also Sean
D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 403–20 (2005); August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal
Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
37, 43–46 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
ON
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again, one may observe the influence of the premise that some external surveillance (here, transnational codes and transparency initiatives in the corporation’s State of nationality) is required to ensure
that a business acts in an ethical way.
Yet, it should also be noted that given the historical record of
for-profit firms operating in some of the countries we now regard as
failed or fragile States, the dearth of extended analyses of their socially constructive capacity might be regarded as reasonable. Indeed,
for-profit firms have been harnessed by imperial States for their colonial projects over the centuries. 128 Joint-stock corporations have
been particularly important vehicles for territorial expansion and administration of foreign peoples when the mother country either
lacked the institutional capacity or the financial resolve to undertake
such projects directly. 129 But, imperial States like England, France,
Spain, the Netherlands, and Belgium also governed lands and peoples
overseas through the colonial corporate form to ensure maximum
profit with minimal social investment. 130 In addition, scholars have
increasingly brought to the fore the imperial underpinning of the
modern United States and the significant role of business interests in
this country’s breathtaking geographic expansion over the course of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 131
Of course, many of these projects were undertaken at the direction or encouragement of States. The corporate form merely provided a convenient legal vehicle for the structuring of the governance
project and so this might be an important distinction to draw between
these earlier highly problematic endeavors and those highlighted in
Part I.
Another important distinction relates to the general legal
128. See generally Jeffrey Herbst, STATES AND POWER IN AFRICA: COMPARATIVE
LESSONS IN AUTHORITY AND CONTROL (2000); MIGUEL A. CENTENO, BLOOD AND DEBT:
WAR AND STATEMAKING IN LATIN AMERICA (2002).
129. See generally H.V. BOWEN, THE BUSINESS OF EMPIRE: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
AND IMPERIAL BRITAIN, 1756–1833 (2008).

130. STEVEN PRESS, ROGUE EMPIRES: CONTRACTS AND CONMEN IN EUROPE’S SCRAMBLE
AFRICA (2017); Julia Adams & Steven Pincus, Imperial States in the Age of Discovery,
in THE MANY HANDS OF THE STATE: THEORIZING POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND SOCIAL
CONTROL 333 (Kimberly J. Morgan & Ann Shola Orloff eds., 2017); Antony Anghie,
Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International
Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 37 (1999) (observing that administrative problems associated
with colonial governance through corporations flowed naturally from the fact that “the
territories were administered simply for profit”).
FOR

131. PAUL FRYMER, BUILDING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE ERA OF TERRITORIAL AND
POLITICAL EXPANSION 42–43 (2017); JACK P. GREENE, CREATING THE BRITISH ATLANTIC:
ESSAYS ON TRANSPLANTATION, ADAPTATION, AND CONTINUITY 102–12 (2013).
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backdrop currently and that prevailing during these colonial and quasi-colonial enterprises. Indeed, though the effectiveness of international law may be underplayed by some, we must acknowledge a
prevailing, even if imperfectly executed, understanding today that
various acts—slavery, genocide, conquest of the territory of another
State—are generally impermissible and reprehensible. And the effect
of these norms on business conduct too provides a distinction between now and earlier eras when such understandings were not generally shared. The impact of these developments may be seen in the
voluntary subscription of business actors to a variety of corporate
codes of conduct discussed above that articulate these norms in
greater detail.
Given this history, however, foreign business activity in fragile States will surely raise the specter of past colonial projects. However, this concern is not unique to the private sector. Various humanitarian intervention missions conducted by foreign States and
international organizations have been criticized in this way. The objective of this Article is to acknowledge that past and ensure that it is
not replicated, but also encourage the international community to
think in ways that transcend the bounds of that colonial paradigm so
as to better harness and facilitate the socially constructive capacities
of for-profit firms. It is toward a better understanding of that task
that the next section now turns.
III. PUBLIC GOODS, PROFIT, AND SOVEREIGNTY
This section builds a model to explain when for-profit firms
are more likely to provide public goods by discharging the kinds of
quasi-governmental functions outlined in Part I. It utilizes the conceptualization of these firms as semi-States in order to draw from international law theory and understandings of State behavior rooted
therein to construct a more capacious theory of profit and its compatibility with social gain. This section then deploys economic and organizational theory concerning firm behavior generally, and more
specifically firm behavior in the context of fragile States, to show
that firms operating in such environments often perform quasigovernmental tasks to enhance a sort of reputation-based social capital that facilitates market functionality in the short-term and also enhances their long-term outlook.
This section posits that a firm will perform State functions or
provide public goods when it is able to capture a sufficiently large
portion of the benefit so as to justify the marginal cost of providing
the good or service. However, it suggests that benefit ought to be
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construed broadly so as to make clear that, in the fragile State context, firms often operate in a manner that defies simple accounting
and instead pursue long-term gain through reputation-building projects that allow them to amass social capital. However, that reputation gain may be diminished and the provision of public goods may
be dissuaded by laws that discourage or actively punish operating in
the territory and also by social perceptions that such operations are
somehow illegitimate because they take place in areas of limited
statehood. This last set of concerns is addressed in Part IV.
This section then considers the normative desirability of these
activities. In doing so, it also squarely faces an oft-heard critique:
that firms will more often than not “put profits over people” and accordingly act in a manner that is deleterious to the local population
when not restrained by State actors. 132 At its most extreme, that position may seem something of a straw man, perhaps, but it also operates as an important perception shading the choices of decisionmakers and those seeking to write, implement, and deploy law in this
area, and so it must be addressed here. Given the significance of that
perception and its historical groundings in the utilization of colonial
corporations by States outlined in Part II, it is important to have an
understanding of when firms acting independently will engage in socially constructive behavior. But, this section also explores reasons
for hesitation and concern rooted in alternative conceptualizations of
State sovereignty.
A. Decisionmaking in the Absence of External Constraint
For-profit firms performing State-like functions in areas of
limited statehood are not States. However, they sometimes operate
as so-called “functional equivalents” to the State, filling gaps in the
132. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 48–49 (2002) (examining “the largely
uncontrolled human rights danger posed by multinationals” and asserting “the harsh reality
that corporations often profit from abusive behavior”); OXFAM, UNIVERSAL HEALTH
COVERAGE: WHY HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES ARE LEAVING THE POOR BEHIND 15 (2013),
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp176-universal-healthcoverage-091013-en__3.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8ZU-VZ65] (arguing that “health care
providers and insurance companies are maximizing profits by gaming the system”). See also
Jessica Glenza, Ban Ki-Moon Urges US to Shun ‘Powerful Interests’ and Adopt Universal
Healthcare, GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/
nov/09/ban-ki-moon-us-universal-healthcare
[https://perma.cc/PRX8-EY8B]
(quoting
former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon as observing that “you simply cannot reach
universal health coverage if your health system is dominated by private financing” because
such actors “prioritize profit over care”).
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provision of public services or exercising a degree of authority or territorial control ordinarily associated with government actors. 133 This
subsection highlights parallels between these firms and States so as to
predict the operation of firms in areas lacking effective State oversight by applying insights derived from the behavior of States in the
international community. 134
States often make decisions and take action without fear of
immediate external sanction. 135 The international system lacks a central legislature or executive, and, with a very limited set of exceptions, its principal judicial bodies only take jurisdiction if the State
subject to the potential adjudication of the dispute consents. Enforcement is, thus, one of the critical challenges of international law.
Scholars have discussed at length alternative means through
which the international system enforces its rules, arguing variously
that States punish lawbreakers through reputational sanction and that
constituencies of citizens, politicians, and civil society groups internal to States play an important role in ensuring that States obey international law. Moreover, a significant body of scholarship has instead
focused on creating a culture of compliance internalized by decisionmakers rather than relying on the necessity of sanction. 136
133. See Hans Krause Hansen, Policing Corruption Post- and Pre-Crime: Collective
Action and Private Authority in the Maritime Industry, 25 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 131,
137–38 (2018); Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Dysfunctional State Institutions, Trust,
and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, 10 REG. & GOVERNANCE 149, 150–51
(2016); Stephen D. Krasner & Thomas Risse, External Actors, State-Building, and Service
Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction, 27 GOVERNANCE 545 (2014); Tanja
A. Börzel et al., Does It Really Take the State? 12 BUS. & POL. 1, 2–30 (2012); Tobias
Debiel et al, Local State-Building in Afghanistan and Somaliland, 21 PEACE REV. 38, 38–43
(2009).
134. See U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, ¶ 1 (Aug. 26, 2003) (declaring that “[w]ithin their respective
spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises
have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law”). See also U.N.
Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2003/16, Rep. of the U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights on its Fifty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/2, at 52 (Oct.
20, 2003) (approving the Draft Norms). But see Philip Alston, The ‘Not-a-Cat’ Syndrome:
Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NONSTATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 13–14 (2005) (critiquing the concept of spheres of
influence).
135. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 69 (2008).
136. RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES:

PROMOTING HUMAN
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This enforcement conundrum presents a useful point of intersection between States and for-profit firms that maintain operations
in failed or fragile States. The firm’s State of nationality, or where it
is “at home,” 137 could conceivably regulate and restrain business activities elsewhere through the robust exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 138 However, these efforts have largely proven unsatisfactory
to advocates of legal accountability for a variety of reasons. 139
First, judicial principles of territorialism often dictate that it is
only appropriate for the State in whose territory the alleged injuries
or violations occurred to adjudicate and prescribe with respect to the
acts in question. 140 Second, if conceptualized through the methodology of interest analysis, 141 which functions as an alternative methodology to territorialist approaches to the conflict of laws, the firm’s activities seemingly do not usually implicate fundamental interests of
its home State because injuries likely impacted foreigners and the
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and
Authority in International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 379, 397–99, 403–05 (1999); Koh, Why
Do Nations?, supra note 109, at 2645–56.
137. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011);
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).
138. Anthony J. Colangelo, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
1303, 1343–44 (2014).
139. See Ratner, supra note 94, at 463, 536 (arguing that “as firms have become more
international, they have also become ever more independent of government control” and that
“[i]f the host state fails to regulate the acts of the company, other states, including the state
of the corporation’s nationality, may well choose to abstain from regulation based on the
extraterritorial nature of the acts at issue.”); Singer, supra note 117 at 536–37; Jide Nzelibe,
Contesting Adjudication: The Partisan Divide over Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 33 N.W. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 509–10 (2013); Charney, supra note 93, at 749 (observing that “one
country usually cannot unilaterally regulate TNC [transnational corporations] power and
behavior”); Marina Caparini, Domestic Regulation: Licensing Regimes for the Export of
Military Goods and Services, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET 158–78 (Simon
Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007).
140. Ieva Miluna, Jurisdictional Competence and Applicable Criminal Law with Regard
to Private Military and Security Companies, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION OF MILITARY AND
SECURITY CONTRACTORS: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
DOMESTIC NORMS 529, 531–34 (Christine Bakker & Mirko Sossai eds., 2012); Martinez,
supra note 92, 1393–95; Brief of Chevron Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 3–8, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 101491).
141. Herma Hill Kay, Currie’s Interest Analysis in the 21st Century: Losing the Battle,
But Winning the War, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 124 (2001) (defining the “bottom line”
of interest analysis as an approach to conflict of laws which prescribed that “the forum court
would apply forum law in all cases in which the forum had an interest”).
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conduct causing such harms occurred overseas. 142 Indeed, the connection to and interest of the home State become even more attenuated if the firm acts through some foreign subsidiary or overseas contractor, thereby implicating issues of competing sovereignty over the
regulation of entities (subsidiaries and local contractors) arguably
within the regulatory scope of other States. 143 Finally, certain national courts previously receptive to transnational litigation have
proven increasingly hostile to such cases, constructing procedural
and prudential doctrines to avoid having to decide such cases. 144
Accordingly, it may be said that business actors in failed and
fragile States are subject to limited traditional legal constraints because the State in which they conduct their activities is unable to enforce its own regulations and the firm’s home State may not be willing to enforce its own laws with respect to operations abroad. 145
However, a crucial fault line in both studies of corporate social responsibility and international law has been whether corporations and States obey law out of self-interest so as to avoid sanction
(construed either as direct punishment or harm to profits) or whether
such obedience stems from an understanding of obedience as obligatory or in some way morally desirable. The question that often follows, then, is whether the community ought to seek to ensure that a
State or business complies with law by explaining and enhancing the
potentially deleterious consequences of non-compliance or instead by
fostering an attitude that such obedience to law is good and thus desirable for that reason alone. 146
142. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (holding that
“even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application”).
143. Chesterman, supra note 118, at 333 (observing that “[i]t is frequently asserted that
private military companies such as Blackwater operate in a legal vacuum” but that “[t]his is
simply not true” because “[i]n theory, at least, they are subject to the laws of the land in
which they are operating, in particular its criminal law.” Yet, the Article acknowledges that
“[i]n practice, however, these companies operate in places with weak or dysfunctional legal
systems” and that though “contractors have been tried and convicted of crimes . . . such trials
are exceptional.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 414 (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).
144. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015).
145. See Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Governance Without a State: Can it Work?,
4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 113, 121 (2010) (asserting that “[t]he anarchy problem in areas of
limited statehood closely resembles the international system in the absence of an enforcer or
a hegemon,” such that “[t]ransnational or global governance has to cope with the problem
that there is no world state to ensure compliance with costly rules.”).
146. See Larry Cata Backer, Corporate Social Responsibility in Weak Governance
Zones, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 297, 319–21 (2016).
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Of course, the choice might seem to represent a false dichotomy, since profit and morality may align. Consequently, corporate
social responsibility proponents often seek to persuade companies to
undertake socially conscious activities by explaining the potential
profitability of such decisions. 147 Scholars seeking to unpack the relatively strong rate of State compliance with international law have
put forward the importance of reputational benefit or harm to explain
compliance. 148
Invariably, however, there are times when profit does not appear immediately to align with activities that are either obligatory or
that seem to go beyond the standard that law prescribes. In both corporate and international law, scholars have argued that actors under
such perceived constraints will not comply if it is unprofitable to do
so. In business law, the outer constraint of non-profitable activity is
assumed to be imposed and enforced by the State. 149 In international
law, realists like Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have argued that
States act under no independent obligation to comply with international law when it deviates from their own self-interest, since international law is merely a euphemism for self-interest. 150
Yet, this model of pure self-interest begins to break down
when we appraise decisionmaking based not merely on singular decision points or choices when confronted with a particular situation but
on the basis of long-term planning. 151 In this sense, the actors involved may be seen to act against their own self-interest where selfinterest is understood merely in terms of the immediate profit to be
reaped from a single choice. As such, if faced with the choice of violating the human rights of nearby inhabitants to build a road for
transporting valuable minerals and building a road in a manner that
does not violate the rights of those inhabitants, say through consultation and fair compensation, we would expect the firm to act in a
147. Ioannis Ioannou, Thinking Aloud: Profiting from Corporate Social Responsibility,
21 BUS. STRATEGY REV. 39, 39–40 (2010).
148. Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 345–46 (2011); Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and
International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 383–85 (2006).
149. On State power and legal enforcement as crucial in the restraint of opportunist
business actors, see, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1517, 1558 (2009); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809, 1856–58 (2017); Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance
Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1010 (2017).
150. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 184–
85 (2005).
151. JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 124–25 (2015).
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manner that is compatible with long-term viability because humans
are planning agents and a firm that undertakes such a project will
have had to consider the legal routes available. 152 Moreover, if the
firm has had a long history of operating in the community or requires
the continued good will of nearby residents, we would expect the decision to skew in favor of the choice that respects human rights because the formulation of plans will have been a key component of the
activity. 153
Further, if the firm and its managers have committed to one of
the various voluntary codes of good conduct that prescribe adherence
to human rights, we would also expect that obligation to be incorporated into the firm’s long-term planning. 154 Thus, though the seemingly voluntary nature may be critiqued, it does parallel the international lawmaking process whereby States are only bound through
their consent unless the underlying norm is customary or a norm of
so-called jus cogens (peremptory law). 155 Such codes provide not
merely a standard against which to measure corporate behavior and
possible liability, but perhaps more importantly, they provide a
means of coordination, agreement, and public reporting as to best
practices that may lead to processes of internalizing such norms within firm decisionmaking. Thus, once incorporated into a long-term
plan, these norms often prove sticky and begin to exert a stronger
pull toward compliance. 156
152. Id. at 105, 125 (noting that “[t]he key here is that rationality is evaluated in larger
chunks, not isolated decision points. So the correct definition of rationality is that an
action’s rationality is evaluated with regard to its place within a larger, rationally justified
plan.”).
153. See Dirk Hanekom & John Manuel Luiz, The Impact of Multinational Enterprises
on Public Governance Institutions in Areas of Limited Statehood, 55 MGMT. DECISION 1736,
1737 (2017) (asserting that “the results reveal a relationship between the depth of country
embeddedness and the level of engagement of MNEs [multinational enterprises] with public
institutions, and this is related to issues around risk mitigation and time horizons. Deeper
embeddedness in the local markets brings greater exposure to risk leading to more and wider
engagement in governance processes and cross-sector collaborations in order to influence
these concerns.”).
154. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 403,
409–12 (2000) (observing that “establishing a commitment as a legal rule invokes a
particular form of discourse” because “[a]lthough actors may disagree about the
interpretation or applicability of a set of rules, discussion of issues purely in terms of
interests or power is no longer legitimate.”).
155. Id. at 412 (noting that “[o]ver time, even nonbinding declarations can shape the
practices of states and other actors and their expectations of appropriate conduct, leading to
the emergence of customary law or the adoption of harder agreements”).
156. Kenneth Amaeshi & Olufemi O. Amao, Corporate Social Responsibility in
Transnational Spaces: Exploring Influences of Varieties of Capitalism on Expressions of
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That this does not occur in every instance, and the fact that
firms sometimes make a choice that violates human rights does not
necessarily diminish the accuracy of the insight. Indeed, criminal
behavior does not ordinarily obscure the force or value of domestic
law, and similarly violations of international law do not necessarily
mean that the international system is without value or merit. Instead,
our concern ought to be with ensuring the sincerity and strength of
the firm’s internalization of legal norms.
Accordingly, we may rightly be skeptical of operations of
transnational corporations in fragile States undertaken through their
subsidiaries. 157 One challenge with subsidiaries is that they allow for
the potential of a singular transaction. As such, the firm may choose
between pure self-interest and legal obligation in a singular interaction because the subsidiary may be discarded at the conclusion of the
transaction. The reputation and potential liability of the parent company is not necessarily at jeopardy, and thus the long-term calculation, or at least, uncertainty that may point toward legal compliance
is reduced to a more simplistic computation. This will not be the
case with every subsidiary, of course, and some subsidiaries are more
embedded in the fragile State or adhere more closely to the pronounced corporate social responsibility policies of the parent company, but the potential exploitation of operations through subsidiaries is
a challenge. 158
Corporate Codes of Conduct in Nigeria, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 225, 233–36 (2009) (pointing to
the “‘stickiness’ of corporate home country influences across trans national spaces” and
asserting that “MNCs [multinational corporations] carry with them attributes of their
national business systems as they forage into markets outside their nation states.”); Tanja A.
Börzel et al., Racing to the Top?: Regulatory Competition Among Firms in Areas of Limited
Statehood, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT A STATE? (Thomas Risse ed., 2011), 164–65 (asserting
that “firms do engage in a regulatory race to the top, even in areas of limited statehood” but
that “economic incentives alone are not sufficient to ensure the fostering of regulation by
firms,” but instead “corporate self-regulation may require a shadow of hierarchy to be
effective.”); Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Investing Up: FDI and the Cross-Country
Diffusion of ISO 14001 Management Systems, 51 INT’L STUD. Q. 723, 738 (2007) (analyzing
corporate adherence to a voluntary environmental management standard, ISO 14001, in the
context of foreign direct investment [FDI] and finding that “instead of leading to regulatory
races to the bottom in corporate environmental practices, economic integration via FDI can
create incentives for host-country firms to ratchet up their corporate practices beyond the
regulatory requirements,” such that what matters is “not only how much FDI a country
receives but from where.”).
157. Sergio Puig, The Internationalization of Tobacco Tactics, 28 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 495, 515–18 (2018) (discussing the exploitation of subsidiaries by multinational
enterprises).
158. See Justin Tan & Liang Wang, MNC Strategic Responses to Ethical Pressure: An
Institutional Logic Perspective, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 378 (2011) (noting that “[r]egardless
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Similarly, the fungibility and disposability of businesses
structured through large, multi-tiered supply chains, such as Walmart
and Apple, presents a further problem for regulating global business
activity, particularly in the context of fragile and failed States. 159
Though such actors are significant in terms of the economic activity
that they represent, it should be made clear that their activities are not
the main focus of this Article, since the point of such structuring
through supply chains is often to evade or avoid any sense of responsibility for the discharge of governance functions. When it is inconvenient to source an item from a particular location, the company’s
supply chain can often shift fairly easily to producers in another location (unless the resource, product, or commodity sourced in the first
location is somehow unique). Moreover, because employees of the
various contracted suppliers are not Walmart or Apple employees,
those companies are less likely to take on the provision of public services for that set of workers or members of those communities. 160
B. Uncertainty, Trust, and Social Capital
Though the foregoing account may have addressed the objections of those skeptical of allowing firms to maintain any presence in
fragile States for fear that their behavior unconstrained by the host
State will lead to wanton illegality, it does not do enough to explain
or predict why firms might surpass the baseline legal standard of respecting human rights and instead undertake quasi-governmental
functions quite beyond what is legally required of them. To gain a
better understanding of this phenomenon, this subsection grapples
with the question of decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty
and risk. Such conditions are ever-present for business operations in
failed or fragile States that represent a particularly fraught subclassification of the business theory category of so-called emerging
markets.
Firms operating in failed and fragile States often do so absent
of a MNC’s [multinational corporation’s] nationality, we posit that the more a MNC is
ingrained in CSR [corporate social responsibility] principles, the more resistant it will be to
abandon its existing CSR principles and to adopt local ethical practices in the host
country.”); Xiaohua Yang & Cheryl Rivers, Antecedents of CSR Practices in MNCs’
Subsidiaries: A Stakeholder and Institutional Perspective, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 155, 162–63
(2009).
159. Nelson Lichtenstein, Two Cheers for Vertical Integration: Corporate Governance
in a World of Global Supply Chains, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 331
(Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
160.

Id. at 348–50.
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the stability or guaranteed security of the State. Traditional economic accounts assume the presence of the State as both a guarantor of
property interests and enforcer of regulation that governs firm activities and enables general market functionality. 161 The State thus ordinarily provides a degree of predictability for firms taking decisions
and making plans. But without the State, this predictability begins to
crumble.
Indeed, fragile States are characterized by a series of institutional voids, whereby the State is unable to supply the regulatory or
enforcement framework provided in more developed markets to ensure sustained commerce. 162 Institutional voids occur in the broader
category of emerging markets, but the problem is particularly acute
in the context of failed and fragile States.
To make up for this seeming absence of governance, economic actors instead form parallel institutions to provide for a degree of
self-regulation and to ensure the predictability of transactions. 163
Such institutions are fundamentally cooperative, requiring that actors
build relationships to exploit their own advantageous capacities. 164
And thus, it may be argued that the quasi-State activities outlined
above give business actors a way to construct such relationships in
and among communities. 165 Where business actors must ensure security, payment either to their own security services or to protection
rackets run by other non-State actors will often suffice. 166 Yet, in
situations of conflict or rapidly-moving upheaval, information is at a
premium because it allows for more accurate planning. In such environments, paying to build communal relationships through the provision of the sorts of quasi-governmental services or products dis161. AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF
GOVERNANCE 13 (2004) (asserting that “conventional economic theory . . . takes the
existence of a well-functioning institute of state law for granted” even though the reality is
instead that “[o]nly advanced countries in recent times come anywhere near the economist’s
ideal picture.”).
162. Cheng Gao et al., Overcoming Institutional Voids: A Reputation Based View of
Long-Run Survival, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2147, 2148–50 (2017); Tarun Khanna &
Krishnan Palepu, Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets, 75 HARV.
BUS. REV. 41, 41–48 (1997).
163. DIXIT, supra note 161, at 3, 5 (proposing that in fragile States firms establish
“alternative institutions to provide the necessary economic governance” and that these
alternative institutions “include self-protection or hired professional protection for property
rights . . . networks of information transmission, and social norms and punishments for
contract enforcement.”).
164. Id. at 32, 65.
165. Id. at 129–31.
166. Id. at 100, 107–08, 133.
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cussed in Part I may be categorized as a potentially profitmaximizing but also socially beneficial activity.
Moreover, without the authoritative imprimatur of the State,
such alternative institutions require trust among actors based on reputation. 167 Reputation is thus crucial to long-term survival in emerging markets, and so it may be that discharging the kinds of quasiState activities discussed earlier allows for firms to demonstrate both
their commitment to a particular locale and to bank social capital that
may prove useful down the line. 168 Commercial decisions in such
markets are often taken against a backdrop of uncertainty, and reputation-based social capital allows firms to self-insure against external
shocks in the absence of a State to provide reliable protection. 169
Here it may be useful to note Antonio Gramsci’s influential
formulation of the nature of power that distinguishes between domination and hegemony. 170 For Gramsci, domination represents the
power of dictation, that of giving commands backed by sanction or
some punishment so as to extract compliance in some explicit fashion. Hegemony, by contrast, is a sort of power of persuasion, one
that is fundamentally embedded in consciousness without the need
for such commands but significant exactly because it does not require
such explicit expression. 171
It may be posited that corporations undertaking quasigovernmental tasks pursue, whether consciously or otherwise, this
latter form of power, or hegemony, as Gramsci might call it. They
may not dictate that the fragile State should follow a particular course
of action, since that sort of domination might attract negative attention based on notions of democratic illegitimacy or improper interference. However, the company’s own performance of the State may
serve to create a locus of power or social capital in the attitude of the
populace and decisionmakers toward the firm that is important and
might later be exploited to the firm’s advantage.
An example drawn from Firestone’s Ebola response might
167. Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, Dysfunctional State Institutions, Trust, and
Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, 10 REG. & GOVERNANCE 149, 151–57 (2016).
168. Cheng Gao et al., supra note 162, at 2160–61.
169. Id. at 2154–60; Hanekom & Luiz, supra note 153, at 1738 (asserting that when
faced with institutional voids “MNEs [multinational enterprises] must engage in novel crosssector partnerships so as to compensate for these institutional gaps.”); Tanya Brühl &
Matthias Hofferberth, Global Companies as Social Actors: Constructing Private Business in
Global Governance, in THE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL COMPANIES 351, 352–56 (2013).
170. Antonio Gramsci, First Notebook § 44, in 1 PRISON NOTEBOOKS 97, 136–37
(Joseph A. Buttigieg ed., 1992).
171. See id.
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serve to illustrate this point. One of the fundamental challenges
health workers and global officials faced in containing the Ebola epidemic was popular suspicion of the State and the various aid organizations that eventually arrived to support the State’s efforts. People
would not inform health workers when a relative was ill for fear of
mandatory isolation, and so the virus would spread. 172 Consequently,
according to one subsequent analysis, “the trust issues Liberians had
for the government and international aid groups . . . developed into
an active avoidance of aid groups and ETCs [Ebola Treatment Centers] in many communities.” 173
However, researchers assessing Firestone’s more effective response made clear that this outcome was due not only to Firestone’s
greater healthcare capacity relative to nearby public sector facilities.
Instead, researchers found that “[a]n important result of Firestone’s
response is the success with which community members identified
suspected Ebola cases, agreed to voluntary quarantine in dedicated
facilities, and minimized stigmatization of Ebola survivors.” 174 Indeed, they affirmed that “[s]ome community members self-reported
signs and symptoms of Ebola, encouraged in part by community radio messages and educational meetings, as well as by high community acceptance of the quarantine and patient treatment facilities.” 175
To be clear, the suggestion is not that Firestone employees
and their families trusted Firestone more than Liberians at large trusted the government. Instead, it is an example of the operation of hegemonic power. Domination by dictating to families that they report
sick relatives or volunteer for quarantine may have caught some cases of Ebola, but it would not have been as effective as cultivating a
willingness among workers and their families to self-report. And this
willingness was based not merely on coercion or dominance but also
on confidence or hegemony with respect to the capability of Firestone’s health system to respond effectively. And Firestone itself

172. See Saliou Samb & Adam Bailes, As Ebola Stalks West Africa, Medics Fight
Mistrust, Hostility, REUTERS (July 14, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthebola-westafrica/as-ebola-stalks-west-africa-medics-fight-mistrust-hostilityidUSKBN0FI0P520140714?feedType=RSS [https://perma.cc/HQU6-PVPY]; Sara Jerving,
Why Liberians Thought Ebola Was a Government Scam to Attract Western Aid: Decades of
Corruption Left Liberians Suspicious of Their Government, THE NATION (Sept. 16, 2014),
https://www.thenation.com/article/why-liberians-thought-ebola-was-government-scamattract-western-aid/ [https://perma.cc/JTA6-E7HV].
173. Hannah Grace Southall et al., Lack of Cultural Competency in International Aid
Responses: The Ebola Outbreak in Liberia, 5 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH 1, 3 (2017).
174. Reaves et al., supra note 9, at 964.
175. Id. at 963.
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benefited by ensuring that its business operations were able to continue despite the catastrophe unfolding in the rest of the country.
On this account, we might think of hegemony as stemming
not from allegiance or agreement with the entity but from the business’ capacity or ability to discharge the sorts of tasks ordinarily expected of the dysfunctional government. The ability of private actors
to accumulate power through hegemony and the inability of the failed
or fragile State to exercise power through either hegemony or dominance is a sociological dynamic of estrangement from public institutions that is important not merely for scholars of fragile and failed
States but also for legal scholars generally. 176
Indeed, the State’s sovereignty is often construed as dependent on its ability to exercise power through dominance or hegemony. 177 When the State is unable to exercise power in either sense, the
locus of that sovereignty entitlement may be subject to question.
This is not to suggest that the private actors detailed in this
Article are in any way sovereign in the way that we might expect
from a State. Indeed, such private actors are not constituted with the
purpose of bearing and performing sovereignty in the same way as
States. They do not bear fiduciary obligations to the citizens of the
territories in which they operate, and this foreignness or seeming lack
of any duty of loyalty or care toward such communities may give
reason for concern. 178
However, their accumulation of social capital through the performance of the State may lead to the accrual of an important attribute of statehood that justifies the term semi-State as more than merely a conceptual tool for reformed analysis but also a category of
business asset important for the firm to ensure its own survival and
profit. As such, the performance of quasi-State tasks by the firm may
itself be categorized as an element of profit if it allows the firm to be
accorded a portion of the authority or legitimacy ordinarily associated with the absent State. 179
176. See, e.g., Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal
Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2075–76 (2017).
177. Stephen D. Krasner & Thomas Risse, External Actors, State-Building, and Service
Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction, 27 GOVERNANCE 545, 545 (2014)
(defining statehood or domestic sovereignty as “the monopoly over the legitimate use of
force and the ability to successfully make, implement, and enforce rules and regulations
across all policy arenas within its territory”).
178. See EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 63–65, 300 (2016).
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179. See Kenneth Amaeshi et al., Corporate Social Responsibility in Challenging and
Non-enabling Institutional Contexts: Do Institutional Voids Matter?, 134 J. BUS. ETHICS
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C. Entrenchment and Illegitimacy
This subsection flags reasons for hesitation before recognizing certain firms as semi-States or encouraging their associated activities. The term has thus far been utilized as an analytical device to
allow for the application of theoretical insights at the convergence of
international law and business theory. But, if the account proves persuasive, the term may serve to germinate a new socio-legal category.
Indeed, in some places, people have almost come to expect the completion of such tasks by a particular firm in the manner that citizens
of developed countries may be seen to demand such performance of
governmental institutions. 180 But, though they may be willing to
benefit from the social capital inherent in that recognition, these
firms do not necessarily aspire to the imposition of quasi-legal obligations that may come as a consequence of the global recognition of
such a role.
Yet, there may be deeper reasons for hesitation before according recognition to for-profit firms as “semi-States” as an established
legal category. If the State were functional, presumably the State
could also exercise a regulatory function over such firms, imposing
potentially expensive standards and requirements for commercial activities, products, and transactions. Without the regulatory function
of the State, the firm is able to do as it likes, to the extent allowed by
the extraterritorial legislation of its home State. It is for this reason
that one observes in some States a degree of seeming competition between powerful business interests and nascent attempts to build a
consensus State, with firms courted to ensure they do not defeat the
135, 142 (2016) (observing with respect to the study’s focal company, Fidelity Bank of
Nigeria, that “Fidelity Bank’s CSR practices are broadly influenced by normative [private
morality] and relational [social legitimacy] motives, which translate to some and
instrumental [sic] [commercial benefits] outcomes.”); Tobias Debiel et al., Local StateBuilding in Afghanistan and Somaliland, 21 PEACE REV. 38, 39 (2009) (asserting that “[a]
sociopolitical order can only be sustained as long as it is regarded as legitimate or as
immutable” such that “power-holders need legitimacy to imbue their power with
authority.”); Brühl et al., supra note 169, at 361.
180. See, e.g., Hanekom & Luiz, supra note 153, at 1737 (noting that in some areas of
limited statehood where the State is unable to provide basic services, “local populations have
come to expect these tasks to be carried out by MNEs [multinational enterprises] operating
in their area that often reluctantly comply.”); Audrey C. Cash, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Petroleum Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Chad, 37
RESOURCES POL’Y 144, 144–45 (2012) (observing that “[t]he growing societal expectation in
the petroleum sector is for MNCs [multinational corporations] to play a more active role in
capacity-building and development activities” and contending that “due to high instability
and an authoritarian regime, oil multinationals are perceived as the purveyors of
development projects by both the state and the local population.”).
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nascent State for fear of eventual regulation. 181
Moreover, the social capital accumulated by firms discharging quasi-State functions may allow for a degree of market entrenchment that will in the long-run concern advocates of the advantages of broader competition. Thus, though the fact that Digicel’s
social initiatives have been linked to brand profile that in turn led it
to corner 70% of the Haitian mobile phone market may be seen as
something of an advertisement for the benefits of intensive corporate
social responsibility programs, the other side of that data point is a
concern as to monopolistic behavior at the eventual expense of the
very citizens Digicel purports to be advantaging.
Finally, as John Ruggie points out with respect to this sphere
of firm activity, any push to impose obligations on such firms could
potentially be to the detriment of the firm, the State, and the people.
Ruggie’s critique is sufficiently significant here that it deserves quotation at some length. He observes, in the context of whether the
general power or demonstrated functionality of firms should lead to
the imposition of international legal obligations, that:
[T]he proposition that corporate human rights responsibilities as a general rule should be determined by
companies’ capacity, whether absolute or relative to
States, is troubling. On that premise, a large and profitable company operating in a small and poor country
could soon find itself called upon to perform everexpanding social and even governance functions—
lacking democratic legitimacy, diminishing the State’s
incentive to build sustainable capacity and undermining the company’s own economic role and possibly its
commercial viability. Indeed, the proposition invites
undesirable strategic gaming in any kind of country
context. 182
To be clear, this Article does not suggest nor recommend the imposition of an obligation to carry out the quasi-governmental functions on
corporations outlined above. It neither endorses the extension of the
responsibility-to-protect principle in international law to corporations
181. See WORLD BANK GRP., CONFLICT IN SOMALIA: DRIVERS AND DYNAMICS 25–29
(2005),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/8476/
360320SO0Conflict0in0Somalia01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.
cc/C3PD-9S82].
182. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Business
and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect
and Remedy” Framework, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010).
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nor seeks to invoke the vast business law literature on the moral or
ethical duty of rescue. 183 Instead, it simply examines the implications of the voluntary discharge by firms of these activities.
However, once that simple distinction with regard to Ruggie’s
statement is highlighted, the other points inherent in his observation
are of concern for the account articulated. Certainly, to the extent
that the provision of public goods by private actors thwarts or otherwise disincentivizes the government from undertaking these tasks,
that may appear to be a significant challenge. But this phenomenon
ought to be of concern only if it is generally accepted that the firms
involved here do an inferior job to the government or if it is demonstrated that it is otherwise preferable for the government to undertake
such activities. Thus, inherent in Ruggie’s statement is either an assumption that the private sector will not provide service in a manner
as competent as the public sector or that there ought to be some other
bias in favor of the functionality of a Western-style, Weberian State
able to perform all functions demanded of it by its citizens. But the
reality in many parts of the world is that such a State is lacking and
so alternatives must be considered. Moreover, even developed States
regularly privatize certain governance functions. There are, of
course, concerns as to the seeming democratic deficit involved in the
processes of decisionmaking undertaken by business actors, and so
these must be acknowledged. 184 However, it may also be argued that
the primary question ought to be whether the service provision, both
in terms of quality and in terms of coverage, is equivalent to that
which could or might be provided by the State.
There are, of course, a range of NGOs and international organizations operating in such settings, such that the choice is not such
a stark one between for-profit firms and the host State. Yet, these
other actors sometimes themselves also fall short in both service provision and in the model of service undertaken.
In Haiti, for example, a massive earthquake in 2010 caused

183. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT, at xi (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/FW2X-NL9C] (“Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt
or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to
protect.”). See also Jay Butler, Amnesty for Even the Worst Offenders, 95 WASH. U. L. REV.
591, 599–609 (2017) (describing the implications of the Responsibility to Protect principle
for international law).
184. See Doreen Lustig & Eyal Benvenisti, The Multinational Corporation as “the
Good Despot”: The Democratic Costs of Privatization in Global Settings, 15 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 125 (2014).
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vast human suffering, eviscerated large swaths of infrastructure, and
severely reduced government capacity. Haiti had experienced significant governance challenges before, but the earthquake was an unprecedented disaster. 185 Thereafter, donations poured in to assist survivors and rebuild the country, and NGOs largely filled the void left
by the recovering State. Indeed, such foreign NGOs became so
ubiquitous that Haiti came to be known as the “republic of NGOs.” 186
Yet, commentators have begun to question where the money
has gone. 187 Infrastructure still suffers from severe deficiencies,
many buildings have not been rebuilt, and widespread poverty persists. Moreover, a U.N. peacekeeping operation deployed shortly after the earthquake introduced cholera to the island, thereby causing
over 9,000 deaths, and then relied on the organization’s legal immunity to thwart victims’ calls for compensation. 188 Additionally, the
earthquake’s destruction and the cholera epidemic that followed contributed to the fact that an overwhelming majority of Haitians now
procure even their water from private companies. 189 Finally, even
the subsistence model of much charitable and U.N. aid provision has
been criticized as out of step with the aspirations of the Haitian people to forge a more autonomous means of recovery. Indeed, in the
185. U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess., 8068th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8068 (Oct. 12, 2017)
(observing that, when the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti was established in
2004, “Haiti was in a profound state of instability and widespread political violence, and a
climate of lawlessness and impunity had affected the everyday life of millions of Haitians,”
such that “State authority was weak and limited to parts of the capital, Port-au-Prince, with
the three branches of power either non-functional or non-existent.”).
186. Kathie Klarreich & Linda Polman, The NGO Republic of Haiti, THE NATION (Nov.
19, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/ngo-republic-haiti/ [https://perma.cc/P37BJV]; VIJAYA RAMACHANDRAN & JULIE WALZ, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV., HAITI: WHERE HAS ALL
THE MONEY GONE? 15 (2012), https://www.cgdev.org/publication/haiti-where-has-allmoney-gone [https://perma.cc/AU6T-Y6LC].
187. Tracy Connor et al., What Does Haiti Have to Show for $13 Billion in Earthquake
Aid?, NBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/whatdoes-haiti-have-show-13-billion-earthquake-aid-n281661 [https://perma.cc/BCT7-XYK3];
see Letter from Patricia O’Brien, Under Sec’y Gen. for Legal Aff., U.N. to Brian
Concannon, Jr., Dir., Inst. for Justice & Democracy in Haiti (July 5, 2013), http://www.ijdh.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/20130705164515.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QQM6-XYM6].
See also Matiangai Sirleaf, Responsibility for Epidemics, 97 TEX. L. REV. 285, 299–300
(2018) (discussing the United Nations’ assertion of organizational immunity in connection
with the Haiti cholera epidemic).
188. U.N. SCOR, 72d Sess., 8068th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8068 (Oct. 12, 2017).
189. Molly Patrick et al., Assessment of Drinking Water Sold from Private Sector Kiosks
in Post-Earthquake Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 97 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 84 (2017);
Richard Gelting et al., Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present, and Future,
89 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 665 (2013).
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aftermath of the earthquake, some local ventures commandeered or
diverted subsistence aid from NGOs toward more entrepreneurial endeavors as a means of long-term viability. 190
As such, democratic legitimacy may be a concern not merely
for for-profit firms but also for the range of NGO and international
organization actors providing public goods in fragile and failed
States. However, we ought also to see democratic legitimacy not
merely in terms of process or elections, since public disaffection with
the lack of State capacity may lead to minimal participation in such
electoral processes. 191 Instead, it is important to think through the
extent to which the approach of the actors involved aligns with the
aspirations of the populace. Where locals seek to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities, the presence of business actors may more
closely align with such aspirations than the activities of charitable,
non-profit organizations, potentially problematizing simplistic notions of which actors are in fact giving closest expression to the
wishes of the people.
What is clear is that the political situation in failed and fragile
States is far from ideal. 192 The violence and upheaval that often mark
such places is well documented. Yet, this Article suggests that an
understanding of the discharge of government functions or the possession of sovereignty that is the progenitor of the obligation to undertake such tasks need not be understood in exclusive terms with the
State at the pinnacle of a hierarchical model. Instead, it may be more
constructive to think of sovereignty in conglomerate terms, with its
component attributes discharged by multiple actors in socially beneficial fashion when the State is absent. 193 However, the realization of
190. Trenton A. Williams & Dean A. Shepherd, Building Resilience or Providing
Sustenance: Different Paths of Emergent Ventures in the Aftermath of the Haiti Earthquake,
59 ACAD. MGMT. J. 2069, 2087–89 (2016).
191. See, e.g., Catherine Charlemagne, The Record Low Voter Participation in Haiti’s
2016 Election, HAÏTI LIBERTÉ (Dec. 28, 2016), https://haitiliberte.com/the-record-low-voterparticipation-in-haitis-2016-election/ [https://perma.cc/66LB-LUGR]; Haiti—Elections:
Voter Turnout of the Elections of 29 January 2017, HAÏTI LIBRE (Feb. 18, 2017), https://
www.haitilibre.com/en/news-20135-haiti-elections-voter-turnout-of-the-elections-of-29january-2017-official.html [https://perma.cc/7Z9X-N4DV].
192. Michael Reisman, Designing and Managing the Future of the State, 3 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 409, 417–18 (1997) (“Wherever and whenever it occurs, the problem in failed states is
classically Hobbesian. Order has broken down and life has become nasty, brutish and
short.”).
193. See generally Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for
Collapsed and Failing States, 29 INT’L SECURITY 85, 108 (2004) (noting that “[s]hared
sovereignty would involve the engagement of external actors in some of the domestic
authority structures of the target state for an indefinite period of time.”).
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such a model with respect to for-profit firms may face certain legal
obstacles that the next section seeks to address.
IV. LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This section highlights how law can make it more difficult for
for-profit firms to operate in failed and fragile States. In so doing, it
builds on the account’s descriptive and theoretical discussion of the
constructive potential of such firms in challenging environments and
seeks to apply these insights to the governing legal regime that often
thwarts such activities.
The materials highlighted include U.S. domestic law with extraterritorial reach and international law in the form of the newly
proposed U.N. draft treaty on business and human rights. The account is not exhaustive but is instead meant to be indicative of the
implications that may be derived from the foregoing account.
The section concludes by extending the analysis to processes
of transnational decisionmaking. Accordingly, it discusses how the
Article’s account might affect and implicate not only existing rules
but also the formulation and application of law in the face of new
policy challenges.
A. Anti-Corruption and Anti-Money Laundering
For decades, the prevailing economic wisdom has been that
State corruption through the payment of bribes to officials is harmful
to economic development and stunts the formation of sound institutions of domestic governance. 194 Moreover, concerned about such
practices spilling over into domestic politics in the aftermath of the
Watergate Scandal, the United States adopted the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act in 1977 to prohibit American companies from paying
bribes to foreign officials. 195 The legislation has subsequently been
extended through the Dodd-Frank Act to require issuers operating in
the extractive industries (such as companies drilling for oil, natural
gas, or other minerals) to report payments to foreign government of-

194. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN & BONNIE J. PALIFKA, CORRUPTION
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 316–21 (2016).

AND

195. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Sinead Hunt, Transparency and Business Advantage:
The Impact of International Anti-Corruption Policies on the United States National Interest,
67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L., 436–38 (2012).
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ficials. 196 And, though the FCPA lay un- or under-enforced for many
years, recent enforcement actions against companies operating in
emerging markets indicate a significant uptick in the utilization of the
Act. 197 Moreover, other States have also adopted significant anticorruption measures, with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the
U.N. Convention against Corruption, and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption among the most prominent international instruments. 198
Yet, much commentary has also been focused on the potentially deleterious effects of these measures on firms doing business in
fragile States. 199 Other scholars have pushed back against this critique of anti-corruption measures, arguing variously that corrupt activity ought to be regarded by international law as a human rights
violation because of the way it harms the citizenry at large, or asserting that anti-corruption measures do not as an empirical matter deter
very many firms. 200
This Article does not seek to resolve the debate concerning
the virtues or detriments of the various anti-corruption regimes that
States have adopted writ large. Instead, it seeks to add nuance to the
application of these statutes by decisionmakers to for-profit firms by
expanding our understanding of the actors and beneficiaries impacted

196. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1504, 15 U.S.C. §
78m(q) (2018).
197. Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic
Strategy, 103 VA. L. REV. 1611, 1646–55 (2017).
198. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 2802 U.N.T.S. 225; United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, Dec. 9, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41; African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption, opened for signature July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5. See
also Rachel Brewster, The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD AntiBribery Convention, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 84, 97–107 (2014).
199. See, e.g., Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding AntiBribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351,
366–73 (2010). Cf. Kevin E. Davis, Does the Globalization of Anti-corruption Law Help
Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 18–28 (Julio Faundez and Celine Tan eds., 2010).
200. See Anne Peters, Corruption as a Violation of Human Rights (Max Planck Inst. for
Comparative Pub. Law & Int’l Law Research Paper, No. 2016–18), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2805099 [https://perma.cc/5K7J-WA4Y]; James Thuo
Gathii, Defining the Relationship Between Human Rights and Corruption, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 125, 146–60 (2009); Leah M. Trzcinski, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
on Emerging Markets: Company Decision-Making in a Regulated World, 45 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 1201, 1222 (2013) (finding that even after being sanctioned for corrupt
activity, “70% of the time a company continues to do business in the implicated country”).
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by these legislative pronouncements in the context of economic development in fragile States.
Indeed, though the prohibition on bribes might be seen as a
way of regulating the conduct of business overseas and ensuring the
compliance of government officials in such countries, the imposition
of penalties upon companies that run afoul of such provisions may
make it significantly more expensive and risky to operate in such jurisdictions. 201 Thus, companies may wish to avoid the risk of doing
business in such locales altogether or may have less capital available
to expend on some of the socially beneficial activities outlined in
Part I. Of course, some companies may persist. But the potential of
sanction is likely to drive out a segment of risk-averse firms.
In any case, the Article’s account in this area suggests that
prosecutors enforcing anti-corruption measures ought to be more
mindful of the indirect consequences of such settlements. Monetary
penalties imposed may harm not merely the company’s management
or its shareholders but also the various people in communities in
which the firm operates as a semi-State. Consequently, local prosecutors may be conceptualized as global governance actors, and their
enforcement of domestic legislation may also impact and impede the
attainment of developmental objectives of citizens in foreign States.
In this respect, though there is little express international law that
might directly regulate or restrain such activities, officials in other
branches of government ought to take such international implications
into account in restructuring the operation and application of these
anti-corruption measures.
A similar pattern is witnessed in the various anti-money laundering regimes. Some companies have been subject to hefty penalties, while others have been ordered to stop doing business in particuMuch of the concern
lar emerging markets altogether. 202
underpinning the anti-money laundering regimes relates to the infiltration of dark money or illicit commercial activity into the financial
operations of banking and other fiscal entities operating in weak
States. Yet, to the extent that such anti-money laundering regulations
201. See Rebecca L. Perlman & Alan O. Sykes, The Political Economy of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: An Exploratory Analysis, 9 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 153 (2017) (exploring
various categories of business cost associated with doing business in emerging markets and
complying with the FCPA).
202. See INT’L FIN. CORP., WORLD BANK GRP., MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF DE-RISKING
4 (2016), https://www.ifc.org/wps/
wcm/connect/68a895a7-dc34-48fd-9c80-215b0fdc6da4/Note+22+EMCompass+-+DeRisking+and+Remittances++FINAL.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
[https://perma.cc/WSM5UJGD].
IN EMERGING MARKETS TO PRESERVE REMITTANCE FLOWS
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force banks and other financial institutions either to exit fragile States
or completely avoid such potentially risky markets, they may defeat
some of the development objectives of for-profit firms that otherwise
might wish to operate there to the potential benefit of the local community.
B. The New U.N. Draft Treaty on Business and Human Rights
As the culmination of the long-running project to reconcile
the power and increasing capacity of business actors with their uncertain place in the framework of international law, the U.N. Human
Rights Council undertook in 2014 to draft a new treaty defining the
legal relationship between business entities and the superstructure of
international human rights law. 203 Accordingly, in July 2018, the
Council’s Intergovernmental Working Group released its first draft of
this new treaty, the so-called Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate,
in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. 204 The draft treaty has
elicited much comment, but this subsection focuses on one particularly pertinent and problematic section.
In its current form, Article 10 of the draft treaty defines various aspects of criminal and civil liability to be attributable to business entities. 205 Article 10(6) mandates liability “to the extent [the
business] exercises control over the operations” in a manner that few
apart from the most ardent international law purists would find controversial. 206 Yet, that same article also allows for liability “to the
extent risk have [sic] been foreseen or should have been foreseen of
human rights violations within its chain of economic activity.” 207
Unfortunately, however, “chain of economic activity” is not a
term of art in international law, and the drafters have given little

203. Human Rights Council, Rep. on the Work of Its Twentieth Special Session, at 157,
187, U.N. Doc. A/69/53 (2014); Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/26/9 (2014).
204. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Intergovernmental Working Grp. on
Transnat’l Corps. and Other Bus. Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, Draft Legally
Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (2018), https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/
282Z-7EX8].
205. Id. at art. 10.
206. Id. at art. 10(6)(a).
207. Id. at art. 10(6)(c).
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guidance as to its expected meaning. Indeed, though some might assume that it merely means “supply chain,” that term is instead used
elsewhere in Article 10 to ascribe liability on the basis of activity of a
business’s subsidiary or “entity in its supply chain” with whom
“there is strong and direct connection between its conduct and the
wrong suffered by the victim.” 208
Moreover, for the sorts of for-profit firms discussed earlier
that undertake fairly expansive functions in fragile States, the term
“chain of economic activity” may well have the effect of encompassing activities or persons well outside the circle that the business
might reasonably be able to control or whose actions it might be able
to predict. Without further guidance, risk-averse companies may
well either avoid such activities or avoid fragile States altogether.
Indeed, if anything, the provision gives such business entities
added incentive to tighten their circle of associations when operating
in fragile States so as to minimize the risk of possible liability if one
of these people or activities turns out to violate the human rights of a
member of the local community.
Furthermore, this version of Article 10 appears to build on an
earlier failed attempt at U.N.-initiated treaty-making in this area of
international law, namely the U.N.’s Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights first promulgated in 2003. 209 The draft
norms mandated that within their “spheres of activity and influence,”
business entities “have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, ensure respect of and protect human rights.” 210 Yet, as with
Article 10 of the new draft treaty, the drafters of the Norms did not
define “spheres of activity and influence.”
It seems instead that a fundamental problem that global policymakers and firms operating in this area have to grapple with is that
of complicity. To what extent is the presence of business in a failed
State itself complicit or otherwise likely contributing to the turmoil
therein? In various settings, the answer will be different, and one objective of this Article has been to show that the answer need not always be the same. Moreover, international law lacks a nuanced or
tailored doctrine of complicity specific to each of its subfields, in-

208. Id. at art. 10(6)(b).
209. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(2003).
210. Id.
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stead preferring a one-size-fits-all model that may be ill-suited to
capturing the complexities of the fragile State paradigm. 211
Further, we must understand complicity both in its legal sense
and in terms of its potential for reputational or social harm. Consequently, to the extent that the new draft treaty opens up a quasi-legal
avenue for civil society groups or activists to criticize for-profit firms
operating in failed States on the basis of harms tangentially connected to these firms, such firms will likely avoid operating in such environments, thereby depriving inhabitants of the potential economic
development that might ensue. Indeed, as John Ruggie presciently
observed in one of his first reports on the relationship between business and human rights, “companies cannot be held responsible for the
human rights impacts of every entity over which they may have some
leverage, because this would include cases in which they are not contributing to, nor are a causal agent of the harm in question.” 212
There is a balance to be struck, surely, and the treaty ought
not to be so forgiving as to tolerate direct violations of human rights
committed by the company itself. However, to the extent that the
current formulation of the treaty allows for claims of complicity to be
marshalled in a legal or quasi-legal manner, the draft treaty may work
to create a degree of uncertainty or almost incalculable risk for forprofit firms acting as semi-States in settings of State failure and may
well inhibit what could potentially be socially constructive business
activity.
C. Universal Health Coverage and the U.N.’s 2030 Development
Goals
In 2015, member States of the United Nations collectively
pledged to attain Universal Health Coverage (“UHC”) for the world’s
population by 2030. 213 Since then, a battle royale has raged over
whether the international community ought to pursue this ambitious
objective by increasing the capacity of State-based institutions to de211. See James G. Stewart, Complicity in Business and Human Rights, 109 PROC. AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. ANN. MEETING 181, 183–84 (2015).
212. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Clarifying
the Concepts of “Spheres of Influence” and “Complicity,” ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/16
(May 15, 2008).
213. G.A. Res. 70/1, ¶ 3.8 (Oct. 21, 2015) (declaring member States’ goal to “[a]chieve
universal health coverage” and affirming that UHC would include “financial risk protection,
access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and
affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all”).
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liver healthcare, or whether donors ought instead to prioritize funding
for private-sector health services providers. The position of those in
favor of building State-based institutions is aptly summarized by
former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who contended in a recent speech that “you simply cannot reach universal health coverage
if your health system is dominated by private financing,” because
such actors “prioritize profit over care.” 214 On the other side of the
debate, the World Bank has consistently endorsed private-sector
healthcare funding and, in December 2017, Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe announced his country’s intention to donate $2.9 billion
to facilitate the delivery of healthcare by private providers in developing countries. 215 Thus, as Richard Horton and Stephanie Clark observed in a timely article in The Lancet, “Few issues provoke as
much disagreement, even anger, as the question of the private sector’s role in delivering health care.” 216
This disagreement is particularly fraught in the context of
failed and fragile States. 217 In principle, international law demands
214. Jessica Glenza, Ban Ki-Moon Urges US to Shun ‘Powerful Interests’ and Adopt
Universal Healthcare, GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2017/nov/09/ban-ki-moon-us-universal-healthcare [https://perma.cc/54U2-ETTS]. See also
Helene Barroy et al., Toward Universal Health Coverage: Thinking Public 1 (WHO,
Working Paper No. 7, 2017), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/255782/1/
9789241512428-eng.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/GS6G-XMBV].
215. See DANIEL COTLEAR ET AL., WORLD BANK GRP., GOING UNIVERSAL: HOW 24
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE IMPLEMENTING UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE REFORMS FROM
BOTTOM
UP
146
(2015),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
THE
936881467992465464/pdf/99455-PUB-Box393200B-OUO-9-PUBDATE-9-28-15-DOI-101596-978-1-4648-0610-0-EPI-210610.pdf [https://perma.cc/7782-2NSN] (“Many UNICO
[Universal Health Coverage Studies Series] programs are contracting with private providers
to deliver care. . . . [and noting] a willingness of governments to use the UHC [Universal
Health Coverage] programs to also engage with private providers [14 programs] or
philanthropic providers [12 programs] to expand capacity.”); INT’L FIN. CORP., WORLD
BANK GRP., THE BUSINESS OF HEALTH IN AFRICA: PARTNERING WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO
IMPROVE PEOPLE’S LIVES 37–50 (2008), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
878891468002994639/pdf/441430WP0ENGLI1an10110200801PUBLIC1.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/G2W3-5Q4C]; Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister, Gov’t of Japan, Prime Minister’s
Remarks on Universal Health Coverage at the UHC Forum (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/2018/winter2018/prime_ministers_remarks.html [https://
perma.cc/DGQ7-QXRM].
216. Richard Horton & Stephanie Clark, The Perils and Possibilities of the Private
Health Sector, 388 LANCET 540, 540 (2016).
217. Throughout this Article, the terms “failed” and “fragile” State have been used as a
convenient shorthand to denote States with severe governance challenges. I am aware of the
imprecision of the terms, and that challenge has long been recognized in this field. On the
difficulties of adequate terminology, see Charles T. Call, The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State,’
29 THIRD WORLD Q. 1491, 1492, 1500–02 (2008).
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that these States guarantee the right to health of their citizens. 218
However, developing public-sector capacity to fulfill this legal obligation is tremendously difficult in practice because of weaknesses in
the States’ institutions. 219 Yet, endorsing private sector healthcare
delivery in such States is controversial because of the suspicion that
profit-motivated actors will engage in exploitative conduct unless the
State restrains them. This tension still frames much of the debate. 220
Many healthcare systems eventually end up being comprised
of a combination of public and private entities, but the willingness of
some to embrace such private healthcare providers is based on the
function of the State as a regulatory backdrop. However, this Article
has sought to show that even when the State is seemingly absent, as
in the context of failed and fragile States, private entities may take on
significant quasi-governmental functions, including healthcare, in an
effective manner.
218. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25.1 (Dec. 10,
1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Dec. 19,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 14, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) (affirming that
“[e]very human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest standard of health
conducive to living a life of dignity”).
219. See Rosemary Morgan et al., Performance of Private Sector Health Care:
Implications for Universal Health Coverage, 388 LANCET 606, 609 (2016) (observing that
“[p]oor performance and lack of availability of the public sector . . . create gaps in service
provision which the private sector steps in to fill, often providing essential primary services
to the population”); Michele Forzley et al., Law as a Guide to Regulatory System Design for
the Health Sector: An Essential Tool for Regulating the Private Health Sector in
Afghanistan and Other Developing Countries, in 7 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV. 61 (Frank
Fariello
et
al.
eds.,
2016),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
824011473329198139/Financing-and-implementing-the-post-2015-development-agendathe-role-of-law-and-justice-systems [https://perma.cc/H2WQ-QQ3W]; Alison Burt et al.,
Eradicating Poverty in Fragile States: Prospects of Reaching the “High-Hanging” Fruit by
2030, at 16 (World Bank Grp., Pol’y Research Working Paper No. 7002, 2014),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/909761468170347362/pdf/WPS7002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XJL8-2FLQ] (asserting that “weak institutions contribute to poor health”).
220. See Press Release, Oxfam Int’l, Unregulated and Unaccountable: How the Private
Health Care Sector in India Is Putting Women’s Lives at Risk (Feb. 6, 2013),
https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2013-02-06/unregulated-andunaccountable-how-private-health-care-sector [https://perma.cc/VG2D-HU2S] (arguing that
“proactively promoting the private sector has led to the proliferation of private health
providers which are unregulated, unaccountable, and out of control”); Karin Buhmann, A
Poverty Perspective on Human Rights and Business, in CASTING THE NET WIDER: HUMAN
RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND NEW DUTY-BEARERS 245, 248 (Margot E. Salomon et al. eds.,
2007) (asserting that “[w]eak legislative, governance and enforcement systems create the
risk of strong companies acting in ways that infringe human rights without being held to
account”).
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CONCLUSION
For-profit firms in failed and fragile States sometimes themselves act like semi-States. They perform the State, discharging
functions ordinarily expected of governments in fundamentally challenging situations. Yet, legal scholars have often overlooked this
phenomenon.
The Article has highlighted the impressive response of Firestone during Liberia’s Ebola outbreak and the various other quasigovernmental actions undertaken by business entities in fragile States
so as to add nuance and expand our understanding of the policy options available to global decisionmakers facing such situations. The
Article has constructed an alternate model based on the accumulation
of reputation as a means of investment or insurance against future
uncertainty to explain the observed behavior of firms discharging
quasi-State functions in settings of State dysfunction. Applying this
model, it has also suggested alternative legal and policy formulations
through which the international community might better encourage
and facilitate such business actors, while also acknowledging reasons
for concern.
As transnational corporations become increasingly wealthy
and powerful and the challenge of State failure persists, international
law must grapple with how business entities may contribute constructively. Although corporations have a problematic history as international actors within the enterprise of European colonialism, the positive contributions of for-profit firms when States do not or cannot
perform core functions today represent another avenue through which
the international community might work to transcend the consequences of that legacy. As such, the Article suggests that versions of
sovereign hybridity that combine public and private entities discharging State-like functions or providing public goods ought to be examined more seriously when States fail.

